Essays on Tax Collection and Local Government Efficiency by Gamannossi Degl'Innocenti, Duccio
IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca
Lucca, Italy
Essays on Tax Collection
and Local Government Efficiency
PhD Program in Economics
XXVIII Cycle
By
Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti
2017

The dissertation of Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti is
approved.
Program Coordinator:
Prof. Massimo Riccaboni, IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy
Advisor:
Prof. Massimo Riccaboni, IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy
Co-Advisor:
Prof. Matthew D. Rablen, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
Co-Advisor:
Prof. Andrea Vindigni, Universita` degli Studi di Genova, Genova, Italy
The dissertation of Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti has been
reviewed by:
Prof. Cinzia Daraio, Universita` di Roma La Sapienza, Rome, Italy
Prof. Roberto Dell’Anno, Universita` degli Studi di Salerno, Salerno, Italy
IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca
2017

A Fabiana

Contents
Acknowledgements x
Vita and Publications xi
Abstract xiii
1 Introduction 1
2 Income Tax Avoidance and Evasion:
A Narrow Bracketing Approach 5
2.1 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Deciding to Avoid and/or Evade Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1 Narrow Bracketing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.2 Decision Staging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Comparison with the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6.1 Audit probability vs. fine rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7 Probabilistic Anti-Avoidance Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Optimal Income Tax Enforcement in the Presence of Tax Avoid-
ance 33
3.1 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
viii
3.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5.1 Optimal Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.2 Risk Aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.3 Variable Social Stigma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4 Italian municipalities efficiency:
A conditional frontier model approach 75
4.1 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4.1 General Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4.2 Optimal Bandwidth Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4.3 Partial Frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.4.4 Local Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4.5 Second Stage Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.6 Construction of the Input, Output and Environmen-
tal Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.4.7 Outlier Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5.1 Local Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5.2 Confidence Intervals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.5.3 Second Stage Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.5.4 Bivariate Analyisis: the Joint Impact of Compound
Altitude and Crime Incidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.8 Supporting Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
References 138
ix
Acknowledgements
1. Chapter 2 was carried out in collaboration with Matthew
D. Rablen, Reader at the University of Sheffield, and
published on Public Finance Review on November 2016.
2. Chapter 3 was carried out in collaboration with Matthew
D. Rablen, Reader at the University of Sheffield, and un-
der submission as a contribution to the Routledge Com-
panion on Tax Avoidance Research.
3. Chapter 4 was carried out in collaboration with Dr. An-
drea Flori, and about to be submitted to the Journal of
Productivity Analysis.
My sincere thanks to my Advisor, Prof. Riccaboni, for giving
support when it was needed the most.
I am deeply in debt with my Co-Advisor, Prof. Matthew
D. Rablen, who provided an endless and valuable source of
inspiration and stimuli that contributed significantly to my
own growth as a researcher.
I want to thank my Co-Advisor, Prof. Andrea Vindigni, I
greatly appreciate the freedom you have given me to find my
own path and the guidance and useful advices you offered
when needed.
I am grateful to Prof. Alessandro Petretto for his invaluable
support.
I also want to thank the two referees, Prof. Cinzia Daraio,
whose works and insights guided me into the world efficiency
analysis, and Prof. Roberto Dell’Anno, for his helpful and in-
sightful comments.
x
Vita
October 3, 1985 Prato, Italy
2010 B.Sc. in Economics
Final mark: 105/110
Universita` degli Studi di Firenze, Florence, Italy
2013 M.Sc. in Economics
Final mark: 110/110 cum laude
Universita` degli Studi di Firenze, Florence, Italy
xi
Publications
1. D. Gamannossi degl’Innocenti, M. D. Rablen, “Income Tax Avoidance and
Evasion. A Narrow Bracketing Approach, Public Finance Review, 2016
Presentations
1. D. Gamannossi degl’Innocenti and Andrea Flori “Italian Municipalities Ef-
ficiency and the Role of Exogenous Factors: A Conditional Frontier Model
Approach.” at University of Rome La Sapienza - Seminar for Course in Pro-
ductivity and Efficiency Analysis, Rome, Italy, 2016
2. D. Gamannossi degl’Innocenti and Matthew D. Rablen “Optimal Income
Tax Enforcement in the Presence of Tax Avoidance.” at Annual Workshop of
the Tax Administration Research Centre - University of Exeter, Exeter, UK, 2016
3. D. Gamannossi degl’Innocenti and Matthew D. Rablen “Optimal Income
Tax Enforcement in the Presence of Tax Avoidance.” at Workshop for the
contributors to the Routledge Companion on Tax Avoidance Research, London,
UK, 2015
4. D. Gamannossi degl’Innocenti, “Enforcement of Tax Laws: an Auction
Theory Approach.” at XXIV Conferenza Societa` italiana di economia pubblica,
Pavia, Italy, 2012
xii
Abstract
State intervention emerged in the economy as an instrument
to deal with a variety of market failures and led to the devel-
opment of a wide set of activities: provision of public goods
and services, redistribution of wealth across citizens by means
of taxes and transfers, education finance, unemployment and
health insurance, labour and market regulations.
From one hand, these interventions may cause efficiency losses
by distorting agents’ choices. From the other hand, efficiency
gains may arise from the reduction of the detrimental effects
determined by market imperfections. However, the scientific
literature also highlights that public intervention in the econ-
omy –necessarily made through institutions shaped by the
conflicting interests of voters, politicians and bureaucrats–
always entails some degree of inefficiency. Hence, whether
state intervention enhances efficiency or not, hinges on the
particular market imperfection and on the particular imple-
mentation of the public intervention considered. The present
thesis, acknowledging the potential usefulness of economic
policies made by the public sector, is focused on two activities
crucial for any state: the collection of revenue, necessary to its
very existence and to any policy, and the provision of goods
and services made throughout its local branches, with the aim
of evaluating its efficiency. Two theoretical contributions are
provided that investigate the impact of avoidance and eva-
sion on the self-declaration of liabilities made by taxpayers
and on optimal enforcement of tax laws. The third contribu-
tion is an empirical inquiry using conditional frontier models
to assess the performances of major Italian municipalities.
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
Revenue collection is affected by an informational problem since liabil-
ities are private information of taxpayers. In developed countries, col-
lection schemes are based on the self-declaration and, in order to con-
trast the incentive to underreporting, states perform audits and levy fines
whenever misleading declarations are detected. In the first contribution
of economics to the analysis of tax non-compliance –the seminal article
of Allingham and Sandmo (1972)– the evasion decision is analyzed in a
portfolio-choice framework. Their work led to a flourishing microeco-
nomics literature that enriched the understanding of the different vari-
ables impacting taxpayers’ declaration of their liabilities: the psycholog-
ical and sociological factors affecting agents’ behaviour, the influence of
legislation and enforcement and how the presence of a variety of non-
compliance activities alters the decision. In the thesis two theoretical
contributions are presented, both belonging to the latter strand of liter-
ature and contemplating avoidance and evasion as non-compliance ac-
tivity. In the first one, the modelling of taxpayers’ joint decision to avoid
and/or evade is based on two key assumptions: (i) the decision upon
the amounts avoided and/or evaded is performed sequentially and (ii)
the avoidance decision is made first. The first feature – that complex de-
cisions are routinely broken down into smaller ones – is often termed
narrow bracketing (Rabin and Weizsa¨cker 2009) in the behavioral litera-
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ture. The second feature – the choice of how to stage the sub-decisions
within the larger composite decision – is sometimes termed decision stag-
ing (Johnson et al. 2012). Crucial with respect to the latter, is whether
the taxpayer is more likely to make the avoidance or evasion choice first.
This question is thought to depend heavily on mentally focal qualitative
features of the choice set (Kahneman 2003). We argue that a focal feature
of the choice set is that avoidance is ostensibly legal whereas evasion is
illegal, hence, the latter one is not considered until all gainful avenues
for the former one have been exhausted. In this setting, the so-called
Yitzhaki puzzle identified in the scientific literature – that an increase in
the tax rate decreases the level of evaded income and of evaded tax – is
proven to hold also in the case of avoidance. However, two major de-
parture from the results obtained previously by the scientific literature
arise. First, for a small enough audit probability, evasion is an increas-
ing function of the audit probability. Although tax avoidance is always
decreasing in the probability of audit, in some circumstances even the to-
tal amount of income lost to evasion and avoidance can be increasing in
the probability of audit. Second, holding constant the expected return to
evasion, it is not always the case that combined loss of reported income
due to avoidance and evasion can be stemmed by increasing the fine rate
and decreasing the audit probability. In the second one, the tax agency
ensures perfect compliance by enforcing optimal truthtelling probabil-
ity while the agents choose simultaneously how much to declare, avoid,
and evade. Thus, the optimal (counterfactual) level and composition of
non-compliance, along with the impact of the relevant parameters, may
be inferred from the analysis of the marginal returns of the different con-
cealing options.
In the last part of the thesis it is provided an assessment of productiv-
ity efficiency for the local government of the major Italian municipalities.
Leveraging on a state-of-the-art methodology, conditional non paramet-
ric frontier models (Daraio and Simar 2005 and Daraio and Simar 2007b),
the analysis allows to assess the impact of environmental factors on per-
formance and to account for the diversity of exogenous conditions faced
by the units. In order to provide a thorough characterization of the pro-
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ductive activity of municipalities, a rich dataset has been gathered from
a variety of sources (ISTAT, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Legambiente).
Our findings show that northern and central municipalities tend to have
better performance with respect to the ones belonging to south and is-
lands. While the investigation does not provide evidence of an effect
of debt stock on efficiency, a negative and significant impact of crime
is identified. Finally, municipalities characterized by an higher altitude
level and/or variability tend to be less efficient.
Notwithstanding major differences in the methodologies employed
in the last chapter relative to the first two, a link between the tax com-
pliance and local government efficiency can be traced in the economic
literature.
While the framework of portfolio choice allows to understand key
insights related to compliance, part of the scientific literature has high-
lighted the importance of intrinsic willingness to pay taxes, the so-called
tax morale, in the determination of non-compliance behaviour (among
the others: Schwartz and Orleans 1967; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Alm
et al. 1992). This intrinsic motivation has been given both psychological
and sociological explanation in terms of the implicit relational contract
between taxpayers and government (see e.g., Akerlof 1982 and Kirch-
ler et al. 2008) and found a formalization as a preference for honesty
in Myles and Naylor (1996) or as a preference for conformity in Traxler
(2010). An extensive experimental evidence (see Torgler 2002 and the
references therein) along with field and survey studies (Alm and Torgler
2006; Torgler and Schneider 2009 and Cummings et al. 2009) highlights
the direct relation between tax morale and tax compliance and Halla
(2012) provided first evidences of a causal link between the two. Further-
more, the idea that price incentives may crowd out intrinsic motivation
has been given strong theoretical grounds and is supported by robust
empirical evidence (for a theoretical reference see Benabou and Tirole
2003, for an empirical investigation see Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997,
closely related to the tax compliance setting is Feld and Frey 2007) and
puts into perspective the role of enforcement with respect to tax compli-
ance. Quoting Alm et al. (1995) (p.15):
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[. . . ] A government compliance strategy based only on detection
and punishment may well be a reasonable starting point but not a
good ending point. Instead what is needed is a multi-faceted ap-
proach that emphasizes enforcement, as well as such things as pos-
itive rewards from greater tax compliance, the wise use of taxpayer
dollars, and the social obligation of paying one’s taxes.
Indeed, Hanousek and Palda (2004), Frey and Torgler (2007), Cummings
et al. (2009) and Barone and Mocetti (2011) investigated the role of insti-
tutions on tax morale and showed a direct relation between the latter and
public spending efficiency. Hence, in the literature it has been reported
evidence of a positive relation between government performance and
tax morale and between tax morale and compliance. While this indirect
evidence of a link between government performance and compliance is
far from being conclusive, it would be of interest to investigate this re-
lation and the derivation of a reliable measure of government efficiency
may represent a first step in this direction. Furthermore, following the
literature, it seems reasonable that a more comprehensive compliance
strategy should combine traditional enforcement instruments (audit and
fines) with compliance enhancing policies aiming to foster honest decla-
ration of liabilities by taxpayers. On this matter, starting from Buchanan
(1967, 1976), it has been pointed out the importance of “fiscal exchange”,
i.e., the need for the government to provide public services suitable in
quality and quantity relative to the tax price imposed. Relevant to the
present setting, a rich experimental literature found evidence of a link
between compliance and public goods provision (Becker et al. 1987; Alm
et al. 1992; Alm et al. 1993; Hsu 2008). Indeed, Hsu (2008) identified a
positive relationship between compliance and the per-dollar amount of
public goods provided. Hence, it seems reasonable that voluntary com-
pliance may be fostered by an improvement of government productive
efficiency that would rely, as a crucial step, on the assessment of per-
formances. In that direction some interesting insights are provided in
chapter 4.
4
Chapter 2
Income Tax Avoidance and
Evasion:
A Narrow Bracketing
Approach
2.1 Abstract
We characterize optimal individual tax evasion and avoidance when tax-
payers “narrow bracket” the joint avoidance/evasion decision by ex-
hausting all gainful methods for legal avoidance before choosing whether
or not also to evade illegally. We find that (i) evasion is an increasing
function of the audit probability when the latter is low enough, yet tax
avoidance is always decreasing in the probability of audit; (ii) an analo-
gous finding to the so-called Yitzhaki puzzle for evasion also holds for
tax avoidance – an increase in the tax rate decreases the level of avoided
income and the level of avoided tax; and (iii) that, holding constant the
expected return to evasion, it is not always the case that the combined
loss of reported income due to avoidance and evasion can be stemmed
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by increasing the fine rate and decreasing the audit probability.
2.2 Introduction
Individuals take a variety of actions to reduce their tax liabilities. The
UK tax authority, for instance, distinguishes three distinct types of action
(HM Treasury & HMRC 2011): those that breach tax law (tax evasion);
those that “use the tax law to get a tax advantage that Parliament never
intended” (tax avoidance) (p. 3); and those that “use tax allowances for
the purposes intended by Parliament” (tax planning) (p. 7). By these def-
initions, both tax evasion and tax avoidance are responsible for signifi-
cant losses in public revenue: estimates provided by the UK tax authority
put the value of tax avoidance at £2.7 bn. and the value of tax evasion
at £4.4 bn. (HMRC 2015). Given the first order significance of tax avoid-
ance, it is of note that the first economic studies relating to tax compliance
(e.g., Allingham and Sandmo 1972; Yitzhaki 1974; Christiansen 1980) ne-
glect the possibility of tax avoidance altogether, and the economic litera-
ture that followed has largely retained this bias.
In this chapter we introduce tax avoidance into the portfolio model
of tax evasion (Yitzhaki 1974). To model the joint tax avoidance/evasion
decision we build on insights developed in psychology and behavioral
economics. In particular, we allow for a pervasive propensity among
human decision makers facing multiple-dimension problems – that of
narrow bracketing. In our context, a decision maker who narrow brackets
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to participants at the TARC 4th Annual Work-
shop (Exeter) for helpful comments. This chapter was written while Gamannossi
degl’Innocenti was a visitor at Brunel University London, whose hospitality he thanks.
Gamannossi degl’Innocenti gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Ministero
dell’Istruzione, dell’Universita` e della Ricerca (cycle XXVIII) and from the European Com-
mission (Erasmus mobility grant 2015-1-IT02-KA103-013713/5).
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would decompose sequentially the joint decision {avoidance, evasion}
into narrow brackets, e.g., {avoidance} followed by {evasion}. A key
feature of narrow bracketing is that the decision maker tends to choose
an option in each stage without full regard to the other decisions and
circumstances that he or she faces (Rabin and Weizsa¨cker 2009). Impor-
tant in this context is whether the taxpayer is more likely to make the
avoidance or evasion choice first. This question–as to the order in which
a complex decision is mentally staged–is thought to depend heavily on
mentally focal qualitative features of the choice set. We argue that a focal
feature of the choice set is that avoidance is ostensibly legal whereas eva-
sion is illegal. Indeed, judiciaries have long upheld the right of a citizen
to challenge the proper interpretation of tax law and to pay only the tax
they owe in law. Thus, while tax avoidance can be seen as the rightful
exercise of a basic right by some lights, tax evasion lacks an equivalent
interpretation. Accordingly, we suppose taxpayers focus on exhausting
opportunities for legal tax avoidance before subsequently focusing on
opportunities for illegal evasion.
We are by no means the first to propose that taxpayers distinguish
qualitatively between legal and illegal actions, however. This distinction
has previously been represented by supposing that a cost owing to social
stigma and/or personal guilt is attached to the illegal act of tax evasion.
This cost can be financial (e.g., Lee 2001) or psychic (e.g., Gordon 1989).
Narrow bracketing offers an alternative perspective: in our model, illegal
evasion is not considered until all gainful avenues for legal avoidance
have been exhausted.1 In this way, our chapter relates to a literature
1Strictly speaking, the stigma cost approach and ours are not mutually exclusive. To
present our approach in the simplest possible light, however, we do not allow for a stigma
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on two-stage decision-making (e.g., Blackorby et al. 1970). Unlike this
literature, however, we do not seek a sequential approach to the joint
avoidance/evasion decision that coincides with the outcome that would
obtain were the joint decision assumed to be made simultaneously.
In addition to the legal distinction between avoidance and evasion,
we further assume that avoidance is costly whereas evasion is costless.
Devising avoidance schemes that reduce a tax liability without ostensi-
bly violating tax law invariably requires a detailed understanding of tax
law, coupled with a degree of ingenuity. A classical form of avoidance
scheme, for instance, involves the implementation of a circular sequence
of self-cancelling option agreements that return the seller to his or her
original position, but in the process create an allowable loss. As, how-
ever, few taxpayers are equipped to conceive of and implement indepen-
dently such avoidance schemes, it is necessary to purchase them.2 Satis-
fying this demand for tax avoidance is a substantial industry dedicated
to the development and marketing of avoidance schemes (see, e.g., Sikka
2012; Committee of Public Accounts 2013). By contrast, many forms of
tax evasion require no technical or legal expertise. Intentionally under-
stating income on the tax return, for instance, may readily be performed
independently. We find that, in two respects, allowing for tax avoidance
importantly changes the characteristics of optimal tax evasion. First, un-
der plausible conditions, evasion is an increasing function of the probabil-
ity of audit. Second, we re-examine the finding of (Christiansen, 1980, p.
391) that “if the fine is increased, but the efforts to detect tax evaders are
cost.
2People not only have difficulties in understanding tax law but also show poor knowl-
edge about tax rates and basic concepts of taxation. For evidence that people often signifi-
cantly underestimate marginal tax rates, see, for example, Gideon (2015).
8
adjusted so as to keep the expected gain from tax evasion unaltered, risk
averters will always reduce their tax evasion.” We are again able to prove
this result, yet in our model it is the total amount of lost tax (through
both avoidance and evasion) that is economically pertinent. When we
consider both avoidance and evasion, it is possible that taxpayers de-
clare more income if the probability of audit is increased, and the fine de-
creased, holding the expected gain from tax evasion constant. This chap-
ter adds to the small, but growing, economic literature on tax avoidance.
The two closest analyses to ours are Alm and McCallin (1990) and Alm
(1988a). The former describes avoidance and evasion as risky assets –
each asset has a return characterized by a mean and variance, and the in-
terdependence between the two returns is characterized by a covariance
– while the latter characterizes avoidance as a riskless, albeit costly, asset.
Whereas both of these analyses consider the simultaneous determination
of evasion and avoidance, in our framework, we argue that these are cho-
sen sequentially. Different from Alm and McCallin, we model the mean,
variance, and covariance of evasion and avoidance, rather than taking
these quantities as exogenous. Unlike in Alm (1988a), we take avoidance
to be risky, owing to the possibility of effective anti-avoidance measures
by the tax authority. Much of the remaining literature on tax avoidance
is, however, concerned with whether income tax has “real” effects upon
labor supply, or simply leads to changes in the “form” of compensation
(e.g., Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002; Piketty et al. (2014); Slemrod (1995)).
Accordingly, in these studies the term “tax avoidance” typically refers
to all form-changing actions that reduce a tax liability.3 This definition
3For a detailed discussion of these “form-changing” actions see, e.g., Stiglitz (1986) and
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
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overlaps with ours, but is broader in the sense that it also includes ac-
tions that fall in to our notion of tax planning. By this broader definition
Lang et al. (1997) estimate that tax avoidance costs the German exchequer
an amount equal to around 34 percent of income taxes paid. The plan of
the chapter is as follows: in section 2.3 we motivate the key behavioral
assumptions behind our analysis, from which section 2.4 develops a for-
mal model. Section 2.5 performs the main analysis and 2.6 compares our
findings to the literature. We extend the model in section 2.7 to allow
for risk in the tax authority’s efforts to illegalize avoidance schemes, and
section 2.8 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2.3 Deciding to Avoid and/or Evade Tax
Two key features of our modelling of the joint decision to avoid and/or
evade are that (i) the taxpayer makes the avoidance and evasion deci-
sions sequentially; and (ii) that the avoidance decision is made first. The
first feature – that complex decisions are routinely broken down into
smaller ones – is often termed narrow bracketing in the behavioral liter-
ature. The second feature – the choice of how to stage the sub-decisions
within the larger composite decision – is sometimes termed decision stag-
ing (Johnson et al. 2012). We discuss each of these features in turn.
2.3.1 Narrow Bracketing
A mass of evidence suggests that people narrowly bracket: a decision
maker who faces a multi-dimensional decision tends to break the de-
cision down sequentially, proceeding at each stage to isolate a single
dimension of the problem without full regard to the other dimensions
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of the problem. In the context of monetary risk, Tversky and Kahne-
man (1981) present an experiment that demonstrates how powerful this
propensity is. In their experiment, people narrowly bracket even when
faced with only a pair of independent simple binary decisions that are
presented on the same sheet of paper. Narrow bracketing lies at the heart
of current explanations of phenomena such as the stock market partici-
pation puzzle (Barberis et al. 2006), the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi
and Thaler 1995; Gneezy and Potters 1997) and choice among lotteries
(Battalio et al. 1990; Langer and Weber 2001).
Cognitive limitations – in perception, attention, memory, and analyti-
cal processing – are thought to be an important reason for narrow brack-
eting (Read et al. 1999). Accordingly, in the experiment of Read et al.
(2001) subjects who were required to resolve a complex choice problem
sequentially actually made better choices than those subjects who were
required to proceed simultaneously. Clearly, however, decision mak-
ing outcomes under narrow bracketing can, in other contexts, appear
worse than those arrived at from a wide bracketing perspective. For in-
stance, decision making under narrow bracketing may violate first-order
stochastic dominance (Rabin and Weizsa¨cker 2009) and, in a famous ex-
ample, the “one day at a time” bracketing observed among New York
cab drivers fails to maximize earnings per hour across days (Camerer
et al. 1997). Thus, while the desirability of narrow bracketing is still the
subject of academic debate (see, e.g., Ko˝szegi and Rabin 2009), the per-
vasiveness of the phenomenon is not in doubt. It is thus of relevance to
understand the nature of the joint avoidance and evasion decision under
narrow bracketing.
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2.3.2 Decision Staging
Having established that taxpayers may well mentally separate the joint
avoidance and evasion decision there remains the question as to how
this is done. According to Kahneman (2003), the way individuals will
choose to stage or frame a decision is heavily shaped by the features of
the situation at hand that come to mind most easily – to use the technical
term, by the features that are most “accessible.” This notion is supported
in the context of tax-related decision making by McCaffery and Baron
(2004). These authors employ a slightly different terminology – the isola-
tion effect – which, however, refers to the tendency of respondents in their
study to “decide complex matters by responding to the most salient or
obvious aspect of a choice set or decision problem.”In the context of the
joint avoidance and evasion decision, we argue that the most accessible
feature of the choice set is that tax avoidance and evasion are qualita-
tively distinct: one is legal, and the right to practice it has often been
defended by the judiciary, whereas the other is a crime. Courts on both
sides of the Atlantic have for many years upheld the right of citizens to
challenge the interpretation of tax law (Barker 2009; Prebble and Preb-
ble 2010). In 1936 Lord Tomlin surmised that “[e]very man is entitled,
if he can, to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the appro-
priate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering
them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciative the Com-
missioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his in-
genuity, he cannot be compelled to pay an increased tax.” Similarly, in
the United States, Judge Learned Hand stated in 1947 (in Commissioner
vs. Newman) that “[t]here is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s af-
12
fairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor;
and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the
law demands.”There is evidence that these traditional legal arguments
continue to affect public sentiment towards tax avoidance. In the quali-
tative study of Kirchler et al. (2003), participants relate tax avoidance to
law- ful acts enabling tax reduction, to cleverness, and to costs. Tax eva-
sion, by contrast, is associated with illegal acts such as fraud, criminal
prosecution, risk, tax audits, punishment, penalty, and the risk of detec-
tion. In this sense, we argue that, for many taxpayers, tax avoidance is
qualitatively preferred to evasion. Accordingly, we argue that taxpayers
would exhaust the scope for legal avoidance before subsequently decid-
ing whether or not they addition- ally wish to evade illegally (rather than
the other way round).
2.4 Model
A taxpayer has an income (wealth) w and faces a tax on income given
by tw, where t ∈ (0, 1). Taxpayers behave as if they maximize expected
utility, where utility is denoted by U (z) = log z.4 The taxpayer’s true in-
come is not observed by the tax authority, but the taxpayer must declare
an amount x ∈ [0, w]. The taxpayer can choose to avoid paying tax on
an amount of income A ∈ [0, w], and subsequently to evade illegally an
amount of incomeE ∈ [0, w −A], so x = w−E−A. Evasion is financially
costless but avoidance technology must be bought in a market in which
4Thus taxpayers are risk averse and have a constant (unit) co-efficient of relative risk
aversion. We adopt the logarithmic form for reasons of analytic tractability, though we note
that the assumption of constant relative risk aversion commands considerable empirical
support (see, e.g., Chiappori and Paiella 2011.
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“promoters” sell avoidance schemes to “users”.5 A common feature of
this market is the “no saving, no fee” arrangement under which the price
received by a promoter is linked to the amount by which their scheme
stands to reduce the user’s tax liability. Although sys- tematic informa-
tion regarding the contractual terms of avoidance schemes is scarce, we
understand from a detailed investigation in the UK that, for the majority
of mass-marketed schemes, the fee is related to the reduction in the an-
nual theoretical tax liability of the user, not the expost realization of the tax
saved ( Committee of Public Accounts 2013). Thus, the monetary risks
associated with the possible subsequent detection and termination of a
tax avoidance scheme are borne by the user.6 Accordingly, we assume
that the promoter’s fee is a proportion φ ∈ (0, 1) of the amount by which
the taxpayer’s tax liability stands to be reduced, tA. In this way, φ may
be interpreted as measuring the degree of competition in the market for
tax avoidance schemes, with lower values of φ indicating the presence
of stronger competitive forces. Although traditional arguments around
the morality of tax avoidance continue to affect importantly public sen-
timent, there has nonetheless been a discernible shift in the attitudes of
the judiciary, beginning in the 1980s (Stevens 2013). Increasingly, courts
apply a purposive interpretation, as summarized by Judge Ribeiro, who
states (in Collector of Stamp Revenue vs. Arrowtown Assets Ltd.) who that
“the ultimate question is whether the relevant statutory provisions, con-
strued purposively, were intended to apply to the transaction, viewed
5For analyses of the market for tax advice see, e.g., Reinganum and Wilde (1991) and
Damjanovic and Ulph (2010).
6It is apparent that such arrangements give promoters incentives to misrepresent the
level of risk involved in particular schemes. Consistent with this point, (Committee of
Public Accounts, 2013, p.11) indeed finds evidence of such mis-selling.
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realistically.” Armed with this purposive interpretation of the law, tax
authorities now routinely seek to have avoid ance schemes ruled ille-
gal. Yet taxpayers may legitimately continue to use an avoidance scheme
while the (often lengthy) process of shutting it down is ongoing. More-
over, if the scheme is eventually declared illegal, the tax authority can
only seek the amount of tax that was properly due (it cannot levy fines
retrospectively). Inherent in our definition of tax avoidance (as distinct
from tax planning) is that–should the tax authority learn of the scheme–
it will consider it illegal. The taxpayer’s income declaration is audited
with probability p ∈ (0, 1). If audited, E and A are observed and the
taxpayer has to pay [1 + f ] tE on account of the amount of evaded tax,
where f > 0 is the fine rate. The tax authority mounts a legal challenge
to the avoidance scheme, which is successful with probability pL. In the
event that the legal challenge is successful, the tax authority obtains the
right to reclaim the tax owed (but cannot levy a fine). In this case, instead
of paying tx in tax, the taxpayer must instead pay t [x+A].
The taxpayer’s expected utility is therefore given by
EU (A,E) = [1− p]U (wn) + ppLU (was) + p [1− pL]U (wau) , (2.1)
where wn is the taxpayer’s wealth in the state in which they are not
audited, was is the taxpayer’s wealth in the state in which they are au-
dited and the tax authority’s legal challenge is successful, and wau is the
taxpayer’s wealth in the state in which they are audited and the tax au-
thority’s legal challenge is unsuccessful:
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was (A,E) = w − t [w − E]− [1 + f ] tE − φtA; (2.2)
wau (A,E) = w − t [w −A− E]− [1 + f ] tE − φtA; (2.3)
wn (A,E) = w − t [w −A− E]− φtA. (2.4)
A key distinguishing factor between evasion and avoidance in this
context is that avoidance entails a cost φtA in all states of the world.
Thus, if avoidance is detected and the scheme closed down a taxpayer
is worse-off for having chosen to avoid, even though they are not fined
on avoided income. To ensure that the amount of taxes, fines and fees
never exceeds a taxpayer’s wealth for any A + E ∈ [0, w] we must as-
sume [1− t] /t > max {φ, f}.
We suppose that taxpayers choose their preferred level of avoidance
and evasion sequentially: gainful opportunities for tax avoidance are ex-
hausted before the taxpayer decides whether to engage additionally in
evasion. Thus, taxpayers first choose avoided income as
A∗ = arg maxAEU (A, 0) ; (2.5)
and then evaded income as
E∗ = arg maxE EU (A∗, E) . (2.6)
2.5 Analysis
We now present an analysis of the model of the previous section. For
analytic tractability, we shall consider the special case of the model with
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pL = 1, such that legal challenges by the tax authority are always success-
ful. In a later section we shall demonstrate numerically how the results
with pL = 1 relate to the results for the more general case with pL < 1.
To begin, it is helpful to define the function R (z) = [1− z] /z, such
that, e.g., R (p) is the classical odds ratio found in decision theory. We
may then state our first Proposition:
Proposition 1 An interior optimum for avoidance and evasion satisfies
A∗ =
pR (t)
1− φ [R (p)R (φ)− 1]w
and
E∗ =
pR(t)
1− φ
[1− p] [1− fR(φ)]
f
w
where
R(p)R(φ) > 1 > fR(φ);
pR(t)
1− φ
[1− p][1− fR(φ)] + f [R(p)R(φ)− 1]
f
< 1.
Proposition 6 gives closed-form expressions for optimal avoidance
and evasion when both are at an interior maximum, and the conditions
needed for a such an interior maximum to arise. The first sequence of in-
equalities at the bottom of the Proposition guarantee thatA∗, E∗ > 0. The
left-side inequality, R (p)R (φ) > 1, is the condition that the avoidance
gamble be better than fair. As a necessary condition for both inequalities
to hold it must be that R (p)R (φ) > fR (φ), which implies R (p) > f .
This is the standard restriction in the portfolio model of tax evasion that
the evasion gamble be better than fair. The right side inequality at the
bottom of the Proposition ensures that A∗ + E∗ < w. To gain insight
into how A∗ and E∗ are related, note that we may write one as a (linear)
function of the other:
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E∗ (A∗) =
p [wR (t)− φA∗] [R(p)− f ]
f
− pA∗. (2.7)
From (2.7) we note that
∂E∗
∂A∗
= − fR(φ) +R(p)
f [1 +R(p)] [1 +R(φ)]
< 0, (2.8)
so the amount of evaded income E∗ is negatively related with the
amount of avoided income A∗. This finding matches that of Alm et al.
(1990) using data from Jamaica, who find that evasion and avoidance are
substitutes. We now consider the comparative statics of optimal avoid-
ance and evasion:
Proposition 2 At an interior optimum for avoidance and evasion it holds for
A∗ that
∂A∗
∂w
=
A∗
w
> 0;
∂A∗
∂t
= − A
∗
t[1− t] < 0;
∂A∗
∂f
= 0;
∂A∗
∂φ
= −wR(t)
[
p+ (1− p)R(φ)2] [1 +R(φ)]2
R(φ)2
< 0;
∂A∗
∂p
= − R (t)w
φ [1− φ] < 0;
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and for E∗ that
∂E∗
∂w
=
E∗
w
> 0;
∂E∗
∂t
= − E
∗
t [1− t] < 0;
∂E∗
∂f
= − E
∗
[1− fR(φ)] f < 0;
∂E∗
∂φ
=
f [R(φ)]
2
+ 1
[1− φ] [1− fR(φ)]E
∗ > 0;
∂E∗
∂p
=
R(p)− 1
1− p E
∗ ≷ 0⇐⇒ R(p) ≷ 1.
Proposition 2 is derived via straightforward differentiation of the ex-
pressions for A∗ and E∗ in Proposition 6 so we omit the proof. Begin-
ning with the comparative statics of A∗, we see that wealthier people are
predicted to avoid more income than less wealthy people. The second
result is an extension of the well-known Yitzhaki paradox for evasion to
the case of avoidance – avoided income falls as the tax rate is increased.
The intuition for this result is analogous to that for evasion: a higher
marginal tax rate makes the taxpayer feel poorer, and thereby more risk
averse. An increase in the competitiveness of the market for avoidance
schemes (a decrease in φ) increases avoided income, and an increase in
the probability of audit decreases avoided income. Of course, knowing
∂A∗/∂t < 0 does not warrant that the total tax avoided, tA, also falls. It
is straightforward to show, however, that
∂tA∗
∂t
= −
{
1
t [1− t] − 1
}
A∗ < 0. (2.9)
Turning to evasion, the logic of the chain rule implies that, for an
arbitrary exogenous variable z, it must hold that
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∂E∗
∂z
=
∂E∗
∂z
∣∣∣∣
A∗=cons.
+
∂E∗
∂A∗
∂A∗
∂z
, (2.10)
where the first term on the right side is the direct effect of z on eva-
sion, and the second term captures the indirect effect on evasion aris-
ing from the effects of z upon avoidance. Intuitively, the indirect effect
is the income effect imparted upon the evasion choice by movements
in avoidance. Noting that ∂E∗/∂A∗ < 0 it follows that if ∂A∗/∂z and
∂E∗/∂z|A∗=cons. are of the same sign – as turns out to be the case for each
of the variables {w, t, f, p} – then the direct and indirect effects in equa-
tion (2.10) oppose each other. This observation notwithstanding, the first
three results in Proposition 2 – those for {w, t, f} – are each unambiguous
and consistent with Yitzhaki (1974). Unambiguity in this context arises
as the direct effect can be shown to always dominate the indirect effect.
To take the tax rate as an example, we find the direct effect – using (2.7)
– as
∂E∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣
A∗=cons.
= −w [1 +R(t)]
2
[R(p)− f ]
f [1 +R(p)]
< 0, (2.11)
Combining equation (2.11) with ∂A∗/∂t in Proposition 6 and ∂E∗/∂A∗
we can rewrite the direct effect in terms of the indirect effect,
∂E∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣
A∗=cons.
= − [R(p)− f ] [1 +R(p)]R(φ)
[R(p) + fR(φ)] [R(p)R(φ)− 1]
∂E∗
∂A∗
∂A∗
∂t
, (2.12)
such that, by equation (2.10), we obtain an alternative form for ∂E∗/∂t
to that given in Proposition 2:
20
∂E∗
∂t
=− [R(p)− f ][1 +R(p)]R(φ)
[R(p) + fR(φ)][R(p)R(φ)− 1]
∂E∗
∂A∗
∂A∗
∂t
+
∂E∗
∂A∗
∂A∗
∂t
=− R(p)[1 +R(φ)][1− fR(φ)]
[R(p) + fR(φ)][R(p)R(φ)− 1]
∂E∗
∂A∗
∂A∗
∂t
< 0
(2.13)
As well as evaded income being decreasing in the tax rate, it is straight-
forward to show that evaded tax, tE∗, is decreasing in the tax rate too.
As it has no direct effect on evasion, the effect of competition in the
market for avoidance (as captured by φ) is given by (2.10) as simply
∂E∗/∂φ = [∂E∗/∂A∗] [∂A∗/∂φ] > 0. Thus, a decrease in the competi-
tiveness of the avoidance industry increases evasion. The final finding
is that tax evasion is increasing in the probability of audit if R (p) > 1
(equivalently, p < 0.5) and decreasing otherwise. In this case there are
again competing direct and indirect effects upon evasion, but now the
direct effect does not always dominate the indirect effect. Following the
same steps as in the tax rate example above, we obtain
∂E∗
∂p
=
[R(p)− 1] [1− fR(φ)]
R(p) + fR(φ)
∂E∗
∂A∗
∂A∗
∂p
. (2.14)
From (2.14) it is immediate that the direct effect dominates when
R(p) < 1 and the indirect dominates when R(p) > 1.
How plausible is the condition p < 0.5 required for evasion to be
increasing in the probability of audit? A priori it appears highly plausi-
ble given that the IRS audits only around 0.96 percent of individual tax
returns filed in calendar year 2012 were examined (Internal Revenue Ser-
vice 2014). If audits are concentrated on the 20 percent or so of people in
the United States who are self-employed, the probability for this group
would rise to 4.8 percent, still well below the 50 percent level. We now
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wish to characterize the total level of undeclared income, A∗ + E∗:
Proposition 3 An interior optimum for avoidance and evasion it holds for
A∗+ E∗ that
∂ [A∗ + E∗]
∂w
=
A∗ + E∗
w
> 0;
∂ [A∗ + E∗]
∂t
= −A
∗ + E∗
t[1− t] < 0;
∂ [A∗ + E∗]
∂f
=
∂E∗
∂f
< 0;
∂ [A∗ + E∗]
∂φ
=
p2wR(t)
{
R (p) {1− f − fR (p) [R(φ)]2} − f
}
[1− φ]2 f ≷ 0
⇐⇒ R (p)
{
1− f − fR (p) [R(φ)]2
}
− f ≷ 0;
∂ [A∗ + E∗]
∂p
=
wR(t) [1 +R(φ)] {R(p) [1− f − 2fR(φ)]− 1− f}
f [1 +R(p)]R(φ)
≷ 0
⇐⇒ R(p) [1− f − 2fR(φ)]− [1 + f ] ≷ 0.
The first three results of Proposition 3 follow immediately from Propo-
sition 2, for the comparative static effects for both A∗ and E∗ go in the
same direction. Both of the remaining two effects – those for φ and p
– may go in both directions, however. Unlike the condition for E∗ to
increase in p, though, the condition needed for w − x to increase in p
seems far from being satisfied empirically. In particular, it requires set-
ting an especially low f , which, in turn, forces the tax rate to be im-
plausibly high. A similar remark applies to the condition needed for
w − x to increase in φ. The results of Proposition 3 allow us to char-
acterize readily the comparative statics of declared income x∗). For all
exogenous variables except w we obtain that the effect for declared in-
come will take the opposite sign to the effect for total undeclared in-
come, i.e., ∂x∗/∂ (·) = −∂ [w − x∗] /∂ (·). For w, however, we obtain
∂x∗/∂w = x∗/w > 0.
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As a final perspective on the properties of optimal avoidance and eva-
sion, we may characterize the properties of the proportion (or share) of
unreported income that is avoided: sA ≡ A/ [A+ E]. This shall be in-
structive when we come to compare our results with the existing litera-
ture.
Proposition 4 At an interior optimum for avoidance and evasion it holds that
∂sA
∂t
=
∂sA
∂w
= 0;
∂sA
∂f
= φp2 [1− p− φ]R(p)ϑ > 0;
∂sA
∂φ
= −p2 [1− p− fp]R(p)ϑ < 0;
∂sA
∂p
= −f [φp]2 [1− fR(φ)] [1 +R(p)2R(φ)]ϑ < 0;
where ϑ ≡
{
A∗
f [A∗+E∗][1−p−φ]
}2
> 0.
Proposition 4 clarifies that the share of undeclared income that is
avoided is independent of the tax rate (t) and the taxpayer’s wealth (w).
This follows from the observation in Proposition 6 that w and R (t) en-
ter both avoidance and evasion as multiplicative factors. We find that
the probability of audit unambiguously reduces the share of undeclared
income that is avoided, even though the effect of p on evasion can be
of either sign. The results for the effects of the fine rate and the cost of
avoidance follow directly from Proposition 2.
2.6 Comparison with the literature
We now compare the findings of the previous section to the existing lit-
erature. First, we consider Alm et al. (1990). These authors find that
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the quantity [1− ft]−1 is negatively related to evaded income, implying
that an increase in either f or t reduces evasion (consistent with Propo-
sition 2).They also find, like us, that avoided income is decreasing in the
cost of avoidance (as measured in our model by the parameter φ). A
caveat,however, is that Alm, Bahl, and Murray identify avoidance as a
riskless asset, somewhat different from the definition of avoidance as a
risky asset we employ here. Second, we may compare our findings for
optimal evasion to those of Yitzhaki (1974)’s canonical model of tax eva-
sion. Our findings for the effect of wealth, the tax rate and the fine rate on
evasion are consistent with Yitzhaki, but the finding that evasion may in-
crease in the probability of audit is different from that in Yitzhaki (where
evasion is always decreasing in the probability of audit). Third, we may
compare our findings to those of Alm and McCallin (1990), who report
comparative statics results for reported income (x) and for the share of
undeclared income that is avoided (sA). Like these authors, we find that
higher fines for evasion increase reported income and increase the share
of undeclared income that is avoided. Different from these authors, how-
ever, we retain the well-known result of Yitzhaki (1974) that a tax rate rise
will increase reported income (whereas Alm and McCallin report the op-
posite relationship) and, thoughs Alm and McCallin find that a tax rate
rise increases the share of undeclared income that is avoided, we find
that this share is independent of the tax rate. It can be shown that this
independence is robust to allowing for pL < 1, and allowing for a coef-
ficient of constant relative risk aversion that is different from unity. We
are unable, however, to follow Alm and McCallin in examining the com-
parative statics effects of quantities such as the mean and variance of the
return to evasion and avoidance, however, as in our model these quan-
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tities are determined endogenously. Last, we may compare our findings
to those of the theoretical model of Alm (1988a), albeit an important dif-
ference between his model and ours is that he models avoidance as a
riskless asset. Alm presents comparative statics results for the quanti-
ties w − E and the share sx ≡ [w −A− E] / [w − E] = x/ [w − E], i.e.,
the fraction of income net of evasion that is avoided. In his very general
framework, Alm finds all comparative statics for the share sx to be am-
biguous in sign. We similarly find that the effects of φ and p on sx are
ambiguous, but we find that ∂sx/∂f > 0 and ∂sx/∂t > 0. We find that sx
is independent of a taxpayer’s wealth: ∂sx/∂w = 0. The only other two
clear-cut results in Alm (1988a) are that evasion is decreasing in the fine
rate and in the audit probability. In our model the first of these effects is
preserved, but we find that evasion can be increasing in the probability
of audit.
2.6.1 Audit probability vs. fine rate
As a final comparison to the literature, we consider the finding of Chris-
tiansen (1980) that, for a constant expected return to evasion, the amount
evaded is always reduced by increasing the fine rate and by decreas-
ing the audit probability. Following Christiansen (1980), we first restrict
analysis solely to evasion. For a given level of avoidance the expected
return to evasion is given by µE ≡ p [1 + f ]− 1. Holding this constant by
appropriate variation of f , and differentiating E∗ with respect to p, we
obtain:
Proposition 5 An interior optimum for avoidance and evasion it holds that
∂E∗
∂p
∣∣∣∣
µE=cons.
=
wR(t)
(
[1−R(p)] f2R(φ) + [1 + 2f ]R(p)− f)
f2 [1− φ] [1 +R(p)] > 0.
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According to Proposition 5 we are able to replicate Christiansen’s
finding: it always worsens evasion to raise the audit probability and
lower the fine rate, holding the expected return to evasion fixed. In
the context of a model containing both avoidance and evasion, however,
what will be relevant to a tax authority seeking to maximize tax revenue
is the effect of varying p and f on the total level of income that does not
get taxed. On this question we have that:
∂ [A∗ + E∗]
∂p
∣∣∣∣
µE=cons.
=
wR(t) {[1− p] {1 + f [3− 2fR (φ)]} − f [1 + f ]}
[1− φ] f2 ≷ 0.
(2.15)
As the right side of equation (2.15) can take either sign, depending
upon parameter values, we now no longer find that raising fines is al-
ways superior to raising audit probability. Intuitively, this finding stems
from the observation that increasing the fine rate only affects the evasion
decision, whereas increasing the audit probability affects both avoidance
and evasion.
2.7 Probabilistic Anti-Avoidance Outcomes
Up until this point, the analysis has been undertaken with the simplify-
ing assumption that, if the tax authority mounts a legal challenge to the
avoidance scheme, its challenge is always successful. While important in
securing a tractable model, clearly tax authorities are not always success-
ful in their attempts to shut-down avoidance schemes, so it is of interest
to understand how this consideration affects our findings.
Solving for A∗ using the definition in equation (2.5) and the full ex-
pression for expected utility given in (1) we obtain
26
A∗ =
ppLR (t)
1− φ [R (ppL)R (φ)− 1]w, (2.16)
which can be obtained from the solution for A∗ given in Proposition 6
(for the case of pL = 1) simply by replacing p with ppL.7 It follows that
the comparative statics results for A∗ given in Proposition 2 continue to
hold, and that the effects of pL upon avoidance are analogous to those of
p. The solution for E∗ coming from (2.6) is complex, however. We note,
though, that the the taxpayer’s wealth and the tax rate both still enter the
solution multiplicatively – as they do also for A∗ in equation (2.16) – so
these two variables stay independent of the share of undeclared income
that is avoided, sA.
To make further progress we assess the properties of optimal evasion
via a numerical optimization procedure. Figure 1 depicts optimal avoid-
ance and evasion as pL is allowed to vary on the unit interval. 8. For very
low values of pL in the interval denoted [0, pˆL|E=0] avoidance is seen to
be maximal, and the taxpayer does not evade. In a second interval, de-
noted in the figure by (pˆL|E=0, pˆL|A+E=w], the taxpayer both avoids and
evades, and reports no income (x ≥ 0 is binding). In a third interval,
denoted (pˆL|A+E=w, 1], the taxpayer again both avoids and evades, but
7Whereas the expression for A∗ given in Proposition 6 is the unique solution to a first
order condition linear in A∗, the expression for A∗ in (2.16) is one of a pair of solutions to
a first order condition quadratic in A∗. The other solution to this first order condition is
A∗ = −wR (t) / [1− φ] < 0, which however, may be dismissed as, by definition, A∗ ≥ 0.
8The parameter values that produce Figure 1 are: w = 10, p = 0.5, t = 0.8, f =
0.1, φ = 0.22. We note that these values are chosen purely to illustrate cleanly the full
range of possible outcomes of the model. As is well-known, models such as ours, which
implicitly assume taxpayers know the true probability of audit, significantly over-predict
non-compliance if calibrated realistically (see, e.g., Alm et al. 1992 , footnote 3). This diffi-
culty does not appear especially consequential in this context, however, for insights such
as probability weighting (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) have been shown to dramatically
reduce predicted levels of non-compliance, while not importantly affecting its comparative
static properties (these being our interest in this paper)
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now x > 0 (this is the case to which our comparative statics analysis
applies). Within this interval we observe that optimal evasion increases
as the probability of a successful legal challenge increases. This is as ex-
pected, for an increase in pL leaves the returns to evasion unaffected, but
reduces the returns to avoidance, making evasion more attractive rela-
tive to avoidance.
Figure 1: Optimal avoidance and evasion for pL ∈ [0, 1].
In Figure 2 we explore the effect of varying pL on our earlier finding
that evasion can be increasing in the probability of audit.9 On the inter-
val of Figure 2 where both optimal evasion and avoidance are interior, we
9The parameter values that produce Figure 2 are: w = 10, t = 0.85, f = 0.11, φ =
0.17, pL ∈ {0.7, 1}. The same qualitative conclusions obtain if the parameter values used
to draw Figure 1 are instead used, but these alternative parameter values yield improved
visual clarity.
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Figure 2: Optimal avoidance and evasion for pL < 1 and pL = 1.
see that reducing pL below unity reduces to a value below one-half the
threshold audit probability above which evasion is decreasing in p. Thus
lower values of pL imply a smaller set of parameter values for which
evasion is observed to be increasing in audit probability. Other numeri-
cally generated results we have analyzed – which we do not report here
for brevity – indicate that the qualitative nature of the results given in
propositions 2-4 continue to hold. In particular, the taxpayer’s wealth
and the tax rate continue to act as multipliers in the expressions for op-
timal avoidance and evasion, and w − x may be either an increasing or
decreasing function in φ and p.
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2.8 Conclusion
Although the economic literature has largely limited itself to the study
of tax evasion, tax avoidance is empirically observed alongside tax eva-
sion. We therefore examine the choice of a taxpayer of how much tax
to avoid and how much to evade, under the assumptions that (i) a tax-
payer narrow brackets the joint avoidance/evasion decision – breaking
the decision down into separate avoidance and evasion sub-decisions,
and taking the first of these two sub-decisions in isolation from the sec-
ond; and (ii) that a taxpayer will decide first on whether and how much
tax to avoid legally before deciding whether and how much tax to evade
illegally. Among our results are, first, that an analogous finding to the
so-called Yitzhaki puzzle for evasion also holds for tax avoidance – an in-
crease in the tax rate decreases the level of avoided income and the level
of avoided tax. Second, for a small enough audit probability, evasion is
an increasing function of the audit probability. Although tax avoidance
is always decreasing in the probability of audit, in some circumstances
even the total amount of income lost to evasion and avoidance can be in-
creasing in the probability of audit. Last, holding constant the expected
return to evasion, it is not always the case that combined loss of reported
income due to avoidance and evasion can be stemmed by increasing the
fine rate and decreasing the audit probability.
We finish with some possible avenues for future research. First, it
would be of interest to allow for imperfect audit effectiveness, as in Rablen
(2014) and Snow and Warren (2005b), for it might be that evasion and
avoidance differ in the amount of tax inspector time required to detect
them. Second, it would be extremely useful to perform an empirical test
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on the results derived from the model. Unfortunately, no suitable data is
available to undertake such investigation at the moment. However, an
alternative to this end would be to set up an experimental study. Indeed,
further research along these lines could provide valuable insights to fos-
ter our understanding of non-compliance decision making. A last sug-
gestion is to embed the model within a general equilibrium framework
(see, e.g.,Alm and Finlay 2013), for the partial equilibrium setting ex-
plored here may miss some important wider interactions between avoid-
ance and evasion that should properly be accounted for.
2.9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6: From (1) we have that
∂EU (A, 0)
∂A
=
[1− p][1− φ]
A[1− φ] + wR(t) −
φp
wR(t)− φA (17)
= φp
{
R(p)R(φ)
A[1− φ] + wR(t) −
1
wR(t)− φA
}
. (18)
Solving for the point ∂EU (A, 0) /∂A = 0 gives
A∗ = arg maxAEU (A, 0) =
pR (t)
1− φ [R (p)R (φ)− 1]w. (19)
RewritingA∗ in (19) asA∗ = wR(t) [1− p− φ]φ−1 [1− φ]−1, substituting
this expression forA∗ into (1), and differentiating with respect to E gives
∂EU (A∗, E)
∂E
=
[1− p]φ
[1− p]wR(t) + Eφ −
pf [1− φ]
pwR(t)− Ef [1− φ] (20)
= φp
{
R (p)
[1− p]wR(t) + Eφ −
fR(φ)
pwR(t)− Ef [1− φ]
}
.(21)
Evaluating at ∂EU (A∗, E) /∂E = 0 and solving for E gives
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E∗ = arg maxE EU (A∗, E) =
pR(t)
1− φ
[
[1− p] [1− fR(φ)]
f
]
w. (22)
From (19) and (22) we see that
A∗ > 0 ⇐⇒ R (p)R (φ) > 1; E∗ > 0 ⇐⇒ fR(φ) < 1. (23)
From (19) and (22) we compute
A∗ + E∗ =
pR(t)
1− φ
[
[1− p] [1− fR(φ)] + f [R (p)R (φ)− 1]
f
]
w, (24)
so
A∗ +E∗ < w ⇐⇒ pR(t)
1− φ
[
R(p)− f + fR(p) [R(p)R(φ)− 1]
f
]
< 1. (25)
Proof of Proposition 5: Noting that
∂2E∗
∂p∂f
∣∣∣∣
µE=cons.
= −wR(t) {2 [1 + f ]R(p)− f}
f3 [1− φ] [1 +R(p)] < −
wR(t) [1 + 2f ]
f2 [1− φ] [1 + f ] < 0,
(26)
it follows that if ∂E∗/∂p|µE=cons. > 0 when f approaches its maximum
possible value, i.e., f → R (φ)−1, then ∂E∗/∂p|µE=cons. > 0 for all f <
R (φ)
−1. At f → R (φ)−1 we indeed have
∂E∗
∂p
∣∣∣∣
µE=cons.
=
wR(p)R(t)R(φ) [1 +R(φ)]
[1− φ] [1 +R(p)] > 0. (27)
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Chapter 3
Optimal Income Tax
Enforcement in the
Presence of Tax Avoidance
3.1 Abstract
We examine the optimal auditing problem of a tax authority when tax-
payers can choose both to evade and avoid. For a convex penalty func-
tion the incentive-compatibility constraints may bind for the richest tax-
payer and at a positive level of both evasion and avoidance. The audit
function is non-increasing in reported income, and is higher for progres-
sive tax functions than for regressive tax functions. Higher marginal tax
rates increase the incentives for non-compliance, overturning the well-
known Yitzhaki paradox.
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3.2 Introduction
Individuals take a variety of actions to reduce their tax liabilities. In par-
ticular, one may distinguish between actions that are clearly in breach
of the law (tax evasion); actions that are not explicitly ruled out under
law, but which violate its spirit (tax avoidance); and actions that are le-
gitimate (tax planning). The term tax avoidance is, however, sometimes
used to refer to any action that changes a tax liability purely by affecting
the form (but not the level) of compensation. For instance, tax avoid-
ance opportunities arise in the context of income tax when taxpayers
can shift part of their taxable income into profit or into another time
period that is treated more favourably from a tax perspective-for a de-
tailed discussion of these form-changing actions see, e.g., Stiglitz (1986)
and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). The type of tax avoidance we have in
mind in this chapter is a narrower notion, in the sense that many form-
changing actions are perfectly legal, and therefore fall into our notion of
tax planning. Instead, we consider acts of form-changing that are so arti-
ficial in nature that the courts will deem them illegal if the tax authority
mounts a legal challenge. These acts are often complex, and unlike eva-
sion must be purchased from specialist providers known as promoters.
A recent example of this type of avoidance scheme is a 2012 legal case
in the UK between H.M. Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and a business-
man named Howard Schofield. Schofield bought an avoidance scheme
to help him reduce the amount of tax due on a 10m. capital gain on a
share holding. The scheme used self-cancelling option agreements that
would return the seller to his original position yet create an allowable
mission (Erasmus mobility grant 2015-1-IT02-KA103-013713/5).
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loss. Although, viewed separately, the options created exempt gains and
allowable losses, when viewed together as a composite transaction they
did not. HMRC (2012) described the scheme as an artificial, circular, self-
cancelling scheme designed with no purpose other than to avoid tax, and
it was ultimately outlawed.
The first economic studies relating to tax compliance (e.g., Allingham
and Sandmo 1972; Srinivasan 1973; Yitzhaki 1974; Christiansen 1980)
utilised a general economic model of crime owing to Becker (1968). As
this model lends itself much more readily to tax evasion (which is a
crime) than tax avoidance (which is not outright illegal), these studies
neglect the possibility of tax avoidance altogether. The economic liter-
ature that followed has largely retained this bias, even though in many
countries it seems likely that loss of tax revenue due to avoidance activ-
ity is significant. For instance, according to Cobham (2005), developing
countries lose $285 bn. per year due to tax evasion and tax avoidance.
Estimates provided by the UK tax authority put the value of tax avoid-
ance at £2.7 bn., compared to £4.4 bn. for tax evasion HMRC (2015). Lang
et al. (1997) estimate that tax avoidance costs the German exchequer an
amount equal to around 34% of income taxes paid.
One of the chief lines of enquiry of economists has been to study how
a tax authority can collect a given amount of income tax revenue at min-
imum enforcement cost, when taxpayers can illegally under-report their
true income. The instruments potentially available to the tax authority to
achieve this objective are (i) a tax function, which associates a tax liability
to each level of income; (ii) a penalty function, which associates a level
of penalty to each level of evaded tax, and (iii) an audit function, which
associates a probability of audit to each level of reported income.
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Like much of the literature, we focus on the audit function by exoge-
nously assuming the form of the penalty and/or tax functions. This is
justified if (i) the entity that sets the audit function (the tax authority)
does not have discretion over fiscal policy and (ii) the setting of penal-
ties is highly constrained. In practice both these conditions usually hold:
the design of the tax function is typically seen as a policy matter to be
determined by the Treasury (whereas the collection of tax is seen as an
operational matter), while the penalty function is fixed in legislation (mak-
ing it costly to change) and is bounded in its severity by the require-
ment that it be proportional to the perceived seriousness of the crime.
Sanchez and Sobel (1993) assume that taxpayers are risk neutral, that the
penalty rate on undeclared tax is constant, and that the tax function is
given. They give general conditions under which tax revenue is most ef-
ficiently collected as follows: taxpayers reporting an amount of income
above a threshold amount are audited with probability zero, while tax-
payers reporting an amount of income below the threshold are audited
with a probability that is just sufficient that they will choose to report
their income truthfully.1 Given this audit probability function, all tax-
payers with true income above the threshold amount declare exactly the
threshold amount, and so pay the same amount of tax. Accordingly, the
”effective” tax function (after taking into account the non-payment of
tax due to under-reporting) becomes flat above the threshold declaration
amount.
Another strand of literature assumes that a unified entity can simulta-
neously set the audit, penalty, and tax functions. In this setting Chander
1Earlier contributions that arrived at the conclusion of an audit threshold under less
general assumptions include Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Scotchmer (1987) and Morton
(1993) .
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and Wilde (1998) show that, if taxpayers are risk neutral and fines are
maximal, then the effective tax function is regressive and the audit func-
tion is non-increasing. Marhuenda and Ortun˜o-Ortn (1994) show that
these results continue to hold for a range of other (seemingly more rea-
sonable) penalty functions. Chander (2007) generalises these results to
a particular class of risk averse preferences.2 Few other general results
exist, however: for instance, Mookherjee and Png (1989) show that the
introduction of risk aversion can imply that the audit function is not al-
ways non-increasing in the amount of income declared.
In this chapter we investigate how accounting for the ability of in-
dividuals to avoid tax, as well as to evade tax, alters the conclusions of
models in which only tax evasion is possible. In our model individu-
als can engage in tax evasion by under-reporting their income, but can
also, at a cost, participate in a tax avoidance scheme that permits them to
further lower reported income. Additional to the financial cost of avoid-
ance, both forms of non-compliance are assumed, when detected, to im-
pose psychic harm in the form of a social stigma cost. The nature of the
avoidance scheme is not unambiguously prohibited by law, but is unac-
ceptable to the tax authority. Accordingly, if the tax authority learns of
the scheme, it will move to outlaw it ex-post. If a taxpayer is audited the
tax authority observes whether they are using a tax avoidance scheme
and also the extent of any tax evasion. The taxpayer is fined on the
evaded tax, but the tax authority has no grounds to impose a fine on the
avoided tax (it can only take measures to outlaw the scheme and then
recover the tax owed on the avoided income). In this context we char-
2See, however, Hindriks (1999) for situations in which the regressivity of the tax function
is reversed.
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acterise the audit function first for a linear penalty function, and later
for a general penalty function. The tax authority can condition its audit
function only on the amount of income declared; it does not observe the
amount of non-compliance or how it is split between evasion and avoid-
ance. We therefore look for a taxpayer with income w∗ and a level of tax
avoidance A∗ such that, if this taxpayer (weakly) prefers to report truth-
fully rather than hide an amount of income A∗ then all other taxpayers
will also wish to report truthfully.
We find that, if the penalty function is linear or strictly concave then,
irrespective of the tax function, it holds that (i) if the wealthiest tax-
payer is induced to report honestly, so will all other taxpayers; and (ii)
at every income declaration, x, enforcement must be just sufficient that
the wealthiest taxpayer does not wish to evade the amount of income
w − x (if evasion is more attractive than avoidance), or does not wish to
avoid the amount of income w − x (if avoidance is more attractive than
evasion). That is, if the tax authority enforces to the point where pure
evasion/avoidance becomes unattractive then mixtures of evasion and
avoidance will also be unattractive. On the other hand, if the penalty
function is convex (the marginal rate of penalty is increasing) then it is
possible that the focus of enforcement is not the wealthiest taxpayer, but
rather a taxpayer with intermediate wealth. The level of wealth of this
critical taxpayer is an increasing function of income declared, implying
that the focus of enforcement is on lower wealth individuals at lower lev-
els of declared income, and on higher wealth individuals at higher levels
of declared income. It also becomes possible that taxpayers prefer engag-
ing simultaneously in evasion and avoidance over pure strategies. When
this is so the optimal mix of avoidance and evasion moves in favour of
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avoidance as reported income decreases, as the competitiveness of the
market for avoidance schemes increases, and as the social stigma associ-
ated with tax non-compliance falls.
In all cases we find the audit function to be a non-increasing func-
tion of declared income. When enforcement is predicated on the wealth-
iest taxpayer the audit function is strictly decreasing in declared income.
The function is shifted upwards by an increase in wealth (of the wealth-
iest taxpayer), and shifted downwards by a steepening of penalties, an
increase in the social stigma attached to tax non-compliance, and a less-
ening of competition in the market for avoidance schemes. When the
focus of enforcement is not the wealthiest taxpayer, however, the audit
function becomes independent of declared income and of the compet-
itiveness of the market for avoidance. By analysing the audit function
under example progressive and regressive tax functions we find that,
as in Chander and Wilde (1998), lower enforcement is required to en-
force a regressive tax than to enforce a progressive tax. Stronger risk
aversion moves the audit function downwards, with larger downward
movements for lower values of reported income.
We also find that an increase in marginal rates of tax stimulates incen-
tives for non-compliance, such that the audit function must rise to main-
tain truthful reporting. This is the opposite finding of Yitzhaki (1974), in
which the incentives to be non-compliant diminish as marginal tax rates
increase. The difference in predictions is of interest as Yitzhaki’s find-
ing is counter-intuitive and at variance with most empirical evidence.
Whereas taxpayers can only evade in Yitzhaki’s model, in our model
they can also avoid.We find that the incentives to avoid unambiguously
increase following an increase in marginal tax rates, so even though the
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incentives for evasion may worsen, nonetheless the tax system becomes
more costly to enforce, and compliance falls unless enforcement is stiff-
ened.
The chapter adds to the small, but growing, economic literature on
tax avoidance (in the broad sense). Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002), Piketty
et al. (2014) and Uribe-Teran (2015) analyse theoretically the elasticity of
taxable income in the presence of avoidance, while Alm (1988b) ,Alm and
McCallin (1990) and Alm et al. (1990) examine the choice of an individ-
ual between evasion and avoidance. In the empirical literature, Slemrod
(1995, 1996) finds pronounced tax avoidance effects in the response of
high-earners to tax changes, while Feldstein (1999) finds that accounting
for tax avoidance significantly increases estimates of the implied dead-
weight loss of income taxation. Fack and Landais (2010) show that the
response of charitable deductions to tax rates is concentrated primarily
along the avoidance margin (rather than the real contribution margin),
while Gruber and Saez (2002) show that the elasticity of a broad measure
of income is notably smaller than the equivalent elasticity for taxable in-
come, suggesting that much of the response of taxable income comes
through deductions, exemptions, and exclusions.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: section 3.3 outlines the model;
section 3.4 performs the main analysis; and section 3.5 considers a range
of extensions. Section 3.6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
3.3 Model
A taxpayer has an income (wealth) w; w differs among individuals on
the support [0, w], where w > 0. Each taxpayer faces a tax on income
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w given by t (w), satisfying t (w) < w and t′ ≥ 0. Taxpayers behave
as if they maximise expected utility, where utility is denoted by U (z) =
z (risk neutrality). A taxpayer’s true income w is not observed by the
tax authority, but the taxpayer must declare an amount x ∈ [0, w]. A
taxpayer can choose to illegally evade an amount of income E and to
avoid paying tax on a further amount of incomeA, where x = w−E−A.
Evasion is financially costless but avoidance technology is bought in
a market in which ”promoters” sell avoidance schemes to ”users”.3 A
common feature of this market is the ”no saving, no fee” arrangement
under which the price received by a promoter is linked to the amount
by which they are able to reduce the user’s tax bill. Although systematic
information regarding the precise contractual terms upon which avoid-
ance schemes are typically sold is scarce, we understand from a detailed
investigation in the UK that, for the majority of mass-marketed schemes,
the fee is related to the reduction in the annual theoretical tax liability of
the user, not the ex-post realization of the tax saved (Committee of Pub-
lic Accounts 2013). This implies, in particular, that the monetary risks
associated with the possible subsequent detection and termination of a
tax avoidance scheme are borne by the user 4
Accordingly, we assume that the promoter’s fee is a proportion φ ∈
(0, 1) of the tax saving accruing from the Scheme. In this way, φ may
be interpreted as measuring the degree of competition in the market for
tax avoidance schemes, with lower values of φ indicating the presence
3For analyses of the market for tax advice see, e.g., Reinganum and Wilde (1991) Dam-
janovic and Ulph (2010).
4It is apparent that such arrangements give promoters incentives to mis-represent the
level of risk involved in particular schemes. Consistent with this point, (Committee of
Public Accounts, 2013, p.11) indeed finds evidence of such mis-selling.
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of stronger competitive forces. When a taxpayer is simultaneously evad-
ing and avoiding, the tax saving accruing to the avoidance scheme is
not always unambiguous, however. To see this, note that the total tax
underpayment of a taxpayer is given by t (w) − t (x). This can be de-
composed in two ways: one decomposition is to assign t (w)− t (w − E)
to be the evaded tax, and t (x+A) − t (x) to be the avoided tax, but an
alternative taxonomy is to assign t (x+ E) − t (x) to be the evaded tax
and t (w)− t (w −A) to be the avoided tax. These alternative approaches
are equivalent if the tax function is assumed to be linear, but are distinct
otherwise. As our results are not especially sensitive to which of these
conventions is adopted, however, we adopt the first of these decompo-
sitions in our baseline specification. Hence, we may write the total fee
paid by the taxpayer to the promoter as φ [t (x+A)− t (x)].
We adopt a principal-agent approach in which the principal can com-
mit to an audit and penalty function which taxpayers then take as given.
Though important, as in many other contexts, we do not address the
issue of how the principal can make these commitments.5 A taxpayer
reporting income x is audited with probability p (x). If audited, E and A
are observed. A taxpayer must then make a payment f (t (w)− t (w − E))
on account of the amount of evaded tax, where f (0) = 0 and f ′ > 1
(which, together, imply f (z) > z for z > 0). The taxpayer cannot be
fined on the avoided tax, however. The tax authority mounts a (success-
ful) legal challenge to the avoidance scheme, giving the tax authority the
right to reclaim the tax owed. Thus, instead of paying t (x), the taxpayer
must pay t (x+A).
5Reinganum and Wilde (1986) and Erard and Feinstein (1994) study the case of the prin-
cipal not being able to make commitments.
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The experiments of Baldry (1986) provide compelling evidence that
the non-compliance decision is not just a simple gamble. This can be
rationalized by introducing an additional cost into the decision. This
cost can be financial (Chetty 2009; Lee 2001) or psychic. We adopt a
psychic cost interpretation, where the psychic cost is identified as the
social stigma associated with being caught performing activities that ei-
ther abuse the spirit of the law, or outright violate it. Other models to
allow for costs due to social stigma include Al-Nowaihi and Pyle (2000),
Benjamini and Maital (1985), Dell’Anno (2009), Dhami and Al-Nowaihi
(2007), Gordon (1989), and Kim (2003). Social stigma is incurred when
A+ E (= w − x) > 0 and the taxpayer is audited. Specifically, we write
S (w − x) =
{
0 if x = w;
s > 0 otherwise.
One might think that the stigma cost, as well as having a fixed compo-
nent, might also have a component that increases in the total amount of
non-compliance (A + E). We shall allow for this possibility in Section
3.5 as an extension to the baseline model.6 It might also be argued that
the social stigma associated with avoidance and evasion differ. For in-
stance, Kirchler et al. (2003) find socially positive attitudes towards tax
avoidance (but socially negative attitudes towards tax evasion) among
students, fiscal officers and small business owners in Austria. Recent
poll evidence for the UK, however, suggests that evasion and avoidance
are viewed similarly (Stone 2015). Given the mixed evidence, and that
public attitudes may well vary over time, assuming that social stigma is
6A further line of literature (see, e.g., Hashimzade et al. 2014, 2015, 2016; Myles and
Naylor 1996 relates social stigma to the prevalence of non-compliance among taxpayers.
We do not explore this route here, but offer it as a possible avenue for research.
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associated equally with avoidance and evasion seems reasonable.
A taxpayer’s expected utility is therefore given by
EU = [1− p (x)]Un + p (x)Ua, (1)
where Un is a taxpayer’s utility in the state in which they are not audited
and Ua is a taxpayer’s utility in the state in which they are audited. We
then write Un ≡ U (wn) and Ua ≡ U (wa) − S (w − x), where {wa, wn}
are, respectively, a taxpayer’s wealth in the audit and non-audit states.
Note that, owing to the equality x = w − E − A, we can write wa and
wn as either functions of {x,A,w} or of {E,A,w}. As each formulation
yields separate insights we define both here. In the former case we have
wn(x,A,w) = w − t(x)− φ[t(x+A)− t(x)]
wa(x,A,w) = w − t(x+A)− f(t(w)− t(x+A))− φ[t(x+A)− t(x)]
and in the latter we have
wn(A,E,w) = w − t(w −A− E)− φ[t(w − E)− t(w −A− E)]
wa(A,E,w) = w − t(w − E)− f(t(w)− t(w − E))−
φ[t(w − E)− t(w −A− E)]
We adopt the standard assumption of limited liability, whereby the tax
and fine payments of a taxpayer cannot exceed their wealth w. Accord-
ingly, to ensure that the limited liability condition always holds, we as-
sume wa (x,A,w)−s > 0, a necessary condition for which is that w−s ≥
f(t(w)).
A mechanism for the tax authority consists of a set of possible income
reports M ∈ [0, w], a tax function t (·), an audit function p (·), and a
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penalty function f (·). In this chapter we focus only on incentive com-
patible mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that induce all taxpayers to report
truthfully. The standard justification for this approach is the revelation
principle: when this holds then, for any feasible mechanism, one can find
an equivalent mechanism that induce taxpayers to report truthfully (see,
e.g., Myerson 1979, 1982, 1989). Chander and Wilde (1998) show that
the revelation principle applies when the tax authority has unfettered
ability to choose the tax and audit functions, while the penalty function
is only constrained to be bounded above. Unfortunately, penalty func-
tions of this type deviate significantly from those observed in practice as
the penalty for under-reporting by any amount, no matter how small,
is extreme. As noted by Cremer and Gahvari (1995), however, adopting
more appealing but exogenously given penalties implies that one can no
longer rely on the revelation principle. Whereas most of the literature
has implicitly opted for tractability over realism, here we follow the lead
of Marhuenda and Ortun˜o-Ortn (1994) in considering a setting in which
the revelation principle does not hold. Implicitly, therefore, we restrict
attention to the set of mechanisms that are payoff equivalent to the set of
incentive compatible mechanisms we consider here. Our focus shall be
primarily on the shape of the audit function for a given penalty and tax
function. Accordingly, we do not allow the tax authority to choose the
latter two functions.
The utility when reporting truthfully (honestly) isUh ≡ U (wh), where
wh = w − t (w). In order that the mechanism be incentive compatible, a
taxpayer must never receive a utility higher than U
(
wh
)
when reporting
x < w. This implies that
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p (x) ≥ U
n − Uh
Un − Ua for all A ∈ [0, w − x], x ∈ [0, w] and for all w. (2)
Performing an audit costs the tax authority an amount c > 0. Given this,
a revenue maximising scheme will always minimise p (x) subject to the
condition in (2) holding. Define the function p (x;A,w) as the smallest
probability of audit that induces an (A,w)-taxpayer to report truthfully.
Then
p (x;A,w) =
{
Un−Uh
Un−Ua =
t(w)−t(x)−φ[t(A+x)−t(x)]
f(t(w)−t(A+x))+t(A+x)−t(x)+s x < w;
0 x = w.
(3)
The restriction p (x;A,w) ≤ 1 holds necessarily as Uh ≥ Ua. When x =
w the definition of p (x;A,w) becomes arbitrary, for the condition in (2)
must hold for any p (x). In setting p (w;A,w) = 0 we follow (Chander,
2007, p.325). In what follows we restrict attention to the case x < w
unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. Note in (3) that the tax function
always appears in the form t (z1) − t (z2), with the implication that the
audit function is independent of the level of the tax function (any vertical
shift of t (·) must cancel). Accordingly, it is without loss of generality that
we set t (0) = 0.
The tax authority cannot, however, utilise p (x;A,w) as it observes x,
but not A or w. Instead, the tax authority must choose p (x) such that,
for each x, reporting is truthful for all feasible A and w. Accordingly, we
then define p (x) as
p (x) = max
A,w
p (x;A,w)
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3.4 Analysis
We begin by considering the special case in which taxpayers are risk neu-
tral (U ′′ = 0). We begin without restricting the form of the tax function,
but restrict the penalty function to be linear: f (z) = [1 + h] z, h > 0.
In this way we obtain a very simple version of the model that provides
ready intuitions. For each value of x, we wish to maximise p (x;A,w)
in (3) with respect to A and w (allowing the suppressed variable E to
vary). First, maximising with respect to A, the first order condition for a
maximum is
∂p (x;A,w)
∂A
= − {φs+ {φ− h [1− φ]} [t (w)− t (x)]} t
′ (A+ x)
{[1 + h] [t (w)− t (A+ x)] + t (A+ x)− t (x) + s}2 (4)
Define A∗ = arg maxA p(x;A,w) and w∗ = arg maxw p(x;A,w). Then (4)
implies that A∗ = 0 when
φ > φˆ =
h [t (w)− t (x)]
s+ [1 + h] [t (w)− t (x)]
and A∗ = w−x when φ < φˆ. When φ = φˆ all feasible values of A weakly
maximise p (x;A,w). Taking the case φ > φˆ first, to find p (x) we now
maximise p (x; 0, w) with respect to w. The first derivative with respect
to w is
∂p (x; 0, w)
∂w
=
st′ (w)
{[1 + h] [t (w)− t (x)] + s}2 > 0 (5)
so w∗ = w. In the case φ < φˆ the relevant first derivative with respect to
w is
∂p (x;w − x,w)
∂w
=
s [1− φ] t′ (w)
[t (w)− t (x) + s]2 > 0 (6)
47
A∗ = 0 A∗ = w∗ − x A∗ ∈ (0, w∗ − x) w∗ ∈ (x+A∗, w)
p(x) p(x) A∗ p(x) w∗ p(x)
x − − − − + 0
w + + + + 0 0
φ 0 − − − 0 0
s − − − − + −
pivot f(·) − 0 + − − −
pivot t(·) + + + + − 0
Table 1: Comparative statics
so again w∗ = w.
Proposition 6 If the penalty function is linear then
p (x) =

[1−φ][t(w)−t(x)]
t(w)−t(x)+s φ < φˆ;
t(w)−t(x)
f(t(w)−t(x))+s φ > φˆ.
(7)
Summarising this analysis, when the market for avoidance schemes is
sufficiently competitive (φ < φˆ) it is sufficient to incentivise truthful re-
porting by all taxpayers that the wealthiest taxpayer does not wish to
avoid all of their income. This holds irrespective of the shape of the tax
function. If, however, φ > φˆ then evasion is more attractive to taxpayer’s
than is avoidance. In this case it is sufficient to incentivise truthful re-
porting that the wealthiest taxpayer does not wish to evade all of their
income.
The form of p (x) in (7) applies more generally whenever A∗ takes
corner values and w∗ = w (not only when the penalty function is linear).
It transpires that a corner solution necessarily arises when f ′′ ≤ 0, and
may also arise when f ′′ > 0 under further conditions. We now analyse
the comparative statics properties of p (x) in (7).
Proposition 7 In an equilibrium in which A∗ ∈ {0, w − x} and w∗ = w then
the comparative statics of p (x) are given as in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1.
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Proposition 7 is most readily understood with respect to the expected
marginal returns to evasion and avoidance. The expected return to the
gamble of reporting x < w (rather than w) is given, for a fixed p, by
R (A,E) = p [wc (A,E,w)− s] + (1− p)wn (A,E,w)− wh (w) (8)
In the formulation in (8) we retainA andE, by suppressing x. This allows
us to consider, e.g., the effect of moving A holding E constant (with x
adjusting to maintain the equality x = w−E −A). As taxpayers are risk
neutral it must hold that R (A∗, E∗) = 0, for if R (A∗, E∗) > 0 incentive
compatibility is violated, and if R (A∗, E∗) < 0 the tax authority could
achieve truthtelling at lower cost. From (8) the expected marginal benefit
to, respectively, E and A (for a fixed p) are therefore given by
∂R
∂A
= (1− p− φ)t′ (w −A− E) (9)
∂R
∂E
=
∂R
∂A
− {p [f ′ − 1]− φ} t′ (w − E) (10)
The corner solution A∗ = 0 arises when ∂R/∂E > ∂R/∂A for all A and
the corner solution A∗ = w − x when ∂R/∂A > ∂R/∂E for all A. As the
p (x) in Proposition 7 is predicated on requiring the wealthiest taxpayer
to report truthfully, it is responsive to changes in w. In particular, when
A∗ = 0, if the wealthiest taxpayer chooses to evade in full an incremental
increase in their income, the effect on the expected return to evasion is
given by
∂R
∂w
∣∣∣∣
x=const.
= [1− pf ′ (t (w)− t (w − E))] t′ (w)
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Note by inspection of (7) that at the corner solution A∗ = 0 it holds that
p < [f ′ (t (w)− t (x))]−1, so 1−pf ′ (t (w)− t (w − E)) > 0. It follows that
∂R/∂w|x=const. > 0, so the probability of audit must necessarily rise to
maintain a zero expected return to non-compliance. If insteadA∗ = w−x
then, if the wealthiest taxpayer chooses to avoid in full an incremental
increase in their income, the effect on the expected return to avoidance is
given by
∂R
∂w
∣∣∣∣
x=const.
= [1− p− φ] t′ (w)
By inspection of (7), at the corner solution A∗ = w − x it holds that
p < 1 − φ, so necessarily ∂R/∂w|x=const. > 0. Again, the probability of
audit must rise to preserve a zero expected return. Hence, whichever cor-
ner solution for A applies, the audit function is increasing in the wealth
of the wealthiest taxpayer. As it is gainful to the wealthiest taxpayer to
increase evasion (when A∗ = 0) and avoidance (when A∗ = w − x) it
follows that to discourage the taxpayer from reporting low values of x
requires more enforcement activity than does discouraging the report-
ing of higher values, hence the audit function is decreasing in reported
income.
When the avoidance market is sufficiently competitive that avoidance
is a superior instrument in reducing a taxpayer’s liability than is eva-
sion (i.e., ∂R/∂A > ∂R/∂E) a further increase in the competitiveness
of the market for avoidance schemes (a fall in φ) induces the wealthiest
taxpayer to wish to avoid more, and forces p(x) to increase to maintain
truth-telling. When, however, the avoidance market is sufficiently un-
competitive that in any case avoidance is unappealing (relative to eva-
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sion) as a means of reducing one’s tax liability, then the audit function
becomes independent of φ. Similarly, a multiplicative shift in the penalty
function (which increases the marginal rate of penalty by a fixed pro-
portion) only affects p(x) when the wealthiest taxpayer wishes to evade
rather than avoid (A∗ = 0). In this case evasion becomes more costly at
the margin, thereby relaxing the truth-telling constraint. We also see that
an increase in social stigma results in a fall in the attractiveness of both
evasion and avoidance, allowing p(x) to fall while maintaining honest
reporting.
A proportional increase in marginal tax rates (a multiplicative shift
of the tax function such that t (w) − t (x) increases for every x) increases
both the expected benefits and costs of evasion and avoidance, making
its effect difficult to anticipate with intuition alone. In the absence of
avoidance it is well-known that the standard model of tax compliance of
Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that an increase in the marginal tax rate decreases
the incentive to evade, which implies (in a model without avoidance)
that the tax authority would therefore be able to lower the audit function
while still achieving truthful reporting. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1
we observe the opposite result: as marginal tax rates increase the audit
function increases. To understand this result, first consider the corner
solution A∗ = 0. Here what is crucial is how the expected return to
evasion responds to a multiplicative shift of the tax function. As t (0) = 0
a multiplicative shift can equally be thought of as an anti-clockwise pivot
of t (·) around the origin (intercept). Hence we may write t (·) as εt (·),
and then consider limε→1 ∂R/∂ε|A=0:
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lim
ε→1
∂R
∂ε
∣∣∣∣
A=0
= [t′ (w)− t′ (w − E)] [1− pf ′ (t (w)− t (x))] > 0
Hence, whenA∗ = 0 evasion is made more attractive by stiffening marginal
tax rates. When A∗ = w − x it is instead crucial how the expected return
to avoidance responds to a multiplicative shift of the tax function. We
have
lim
ε→1
∂R
∂ε
∣∣∣∣
A=w−x
= [1− p− φ] [t (w)− t (w −A)] > 0, (11)
which implies that the audit function must shift upwards to restore the
expected return to zero. Noting from (9) that 1−p−φ > 0 is the condition
for avoidance to be gainful in expectation, (11) implies that, when avoid-
ance is gainful in expectation, a multiplicative shift of the tax function
will increase the expected return to avoidance.
Having established that a linear penalty function always leads to a
cornerA∗ we now examine the case in which the penalty function is kept
general. In particular, we are interested in understanding the conditions
under which A∗ ∈ (0, w − x). An alternative approach to differentiating
p(x;A,w) directly (as we did above) is to exploit the observation that
R (A∗, E∗) = 0. The implicit function theorem (IFT) then implies that
(13) and (14) can also be rewritten more generally as
∂p(x;A,w)
∂z
=
[
∂wa
∂z − ∂w
n
∂z
]
p(x;A,w) + ∂w
n
∂z − ∂w
h
∂z
wn − wa + s ; z ∈ {A,w} ,
(12)
giving
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∂p(x;A,w)
∂A
=
{p(x;A,w) [f ′ − 1]− φ} t′ (x+A)
wn − wa + s (13)
∂p(x;A,w)
∂w
=
[1− p(x;A,w)f ′] t′ (w)
wn − wa + s (14)
Using (13), at a stationary point for A we have
p(x;A∗, w) =
φ
f ′ − 1 (15)
and, from (14), at a stationary point for w we have
p(x;A,w∗) =
1
f ′
(16)
To verify when these define a maximum we use (13) and (14) to compute
the second derivatives at a stationary point as
∂2p(x;A,w)
[∂A]
2
∣∣∣∣
∂p(x;A,w)
∂A =0
= −p(x;A,w) [t
′ (x+A)]2 f ′′
wn − wa + s (17)
∂2p(x;A,w)
[∂w]
2
∣∣∣∣
∂p(x;A,w)
∂w =0
= −p(x;A,w) [t
′ (w)]2 f ′′
wn − wa + s (18)
Inspecting equations (17) and (18) we see that their sign is the sign of f ′′,
so for an interior maximum with respect to one or both ofA andw it must
hold that f ′′ > 0. We now investigate the case in which A∗ ∈ (0, w − x):
Lemma 1 IfA∗ ∈ (0, w − x) then p (x) f ′ < 1 < [1− φ] f ′ and p (x) < 1−φ
In respect of the expected marginal returns to evasion and avoidance,
Lemma 1 implies, first, that at an interior value ofA∗ the expected marginal
return to evasion must equal the expected marginal return to avoidance:
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∂R (A,E) /∂A = ∂R (A,E) /∂E. Second, it implies that both expected
marginal returns must be positive.
Using (13) and (14), the effect ofw on p(x;A,w) when ∂p(x;A,w)/∂A =
0 is given by
∂p(x;A,w)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
∂p(x;A,w)
∂A =0
=
[1− φ− p(x;A,w)] t′ (w)
wn − wa + s > 0
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1. This implies that when A∗
is interior, w∗ is maximal. Substituting w = w in (15) we therefore obtain
p(x) =
φ
f ′ (t (w)− t (x+A∗))− 1 (19)
From (13) and Lemma 1 we have
1− p(x)− φ =
s+ f(t(w)− t(x+A∗))− [t(w)− t(x+A∗)]f ′(t(w)− t(x+A∗))
s+ f(t(w)− t(x+A∗)) + [t(x+A∗)− t(x)]f ′(t(w)− t(x+A∗)) > 0
Hence, it must hold that s > εf (t (w)− t (x+A∗)) − 1, where εf (z) =
zf ′ (z) /f (z) is the elasticity of the penalty function with respect to evaded
tax, so interior values of A∗ arise for sufficiently high social stigma costs.
These findings are illustrated in Figures 3, 4, and5.We depict p (x)
in Figure 3, the associated {A∗, E∗, w∗} in Figure 4, and the expected
marginal returns (denoted RA and RE for brevity) drawn at p = p (x)
and E = E∗ in Figure 5. 7. For x ∈ [0, xˆ) A∗ is interior – so p (x) is as in
(19). For x ≥ xˆ A∗ = 0 – so p (x) is as in Proposition 6.
We see in Figure 3 that p (x) is decreasing and concave in x. Consis-
tent with Lemma 1 we see that the audit function lies below 1/f ′, which
7Figures 3, 4, and5 are drawn for a linear tax function, t (z) = 0.3z, a quadratic penalty
function of the form f (z) = [1.1 + z/2] z, φ = 0.2, s = 3, and w = 10
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Figure 3: Audit function for A∗ ∈ (0, w∗ − x].
is itself bounded above by 1 − φ. In Figure 4, A∗ is initially decreasing
and concave in x, andE∗ is initially increasing and convex in x. In Figure
5 the expected marginal return to avoidance is seen to be constant in x.
This is due to the choice of a linear fine rate; more generally, it is seen
from (9) that tax avoidance displays increasing/constant/diminishing
marginal returns as the tax function is regressive (t′′ < 0)/linear (t′′ =
0)/progressive (t′′ > 0). To understand the shape of the expected marginal
return to evasion, observe that the variation of the expected marginal re-
turn to evasion at different levels of evasion is given at the optimum by
∂2R
∂E2
∣∣∣∣
∂R(A,E)
∂A =
∂R(A,E)
∂E
=
∂2R
∂A2
− p (x) [t′ (w − E∗)]2 f ′′
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Figure 4: {A∗, E∗, w∗} for A∗ ∈ (0, w∗ − x].
As f ′′ > 0 at an interior A∗, it must hold that ∂2R/∂E2 < ∂2R/∂A2, as
seen in the Figure.
We now consider the case in which w∗ ∈ (x+A,w). Proceeding in
a manner similar to Lemma 1 we obtain that p (x) = [f ′]−1 > 1 − φ.
Referring to the expected marginal returns in (9) and (10), this inequality
implies that w∗ arises when ∂R (A,E) /∂E = 0 > ∂R (A,E) /∂A. At this
point, the taxpayer does not wish to increase either evasion or avoidance
at the margin.
Using (13) and (14), the effect ofA on p(x;A,w) when ∂p(x;A,w)/∂w =
0 is given by
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Figure 5: Expected marginal return to avoidance and evasion for A∗ ∈
(0, w∗ − x).
∂p(x;A,w)
∂A
∣∣∣∣
∂p(x;A,w)
∂w =0
= [1− p(x;A,w)− φ] t′ (x+A) < 0
This implies that when w∗ is interior, A∗ is minimal. Substituting A = 0
in (16) we therefore obtain
p(x) =
1
f ′ (t (w∗)− t (x)) (20)
From (14) we have
1− p(x)− φ = 1− [t (w
∗)− t (x)] f ′ (t (w∗)− t (x))
s+ f (t (w∗)− t (x)) < 0 (21)
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As (21) is negative, it must be that s < εf (t (w∗)− t (x))−1. Hence, w∗ is
interior when a sufficiently low level of social stigma prevails, whereas
A∗ is interior when a sufficiently high level of social stigma prevails.
Figure 6: Audit function for w ∈ (x+A∗, w].
Our findings for the case when w∗ is interior are illustrated in Figures
6, 7, and 8. Such figures are analogous to Figures 3, 4, and5, but to satisfy
the condition in (21), we now decrease the stigma cost to s = 0.1. For
x ∈ [0, xˆ) A∗ is interior – so p (x) is as in (20). For x ≥ xˆ A∗ = 0 –
so p (x) is as in Proposition 6. In Figure 6 we see that p (x) is initially
independent of x, but falls rapidly in a concave manner after w∗ reaches
the upper bound w∗ = w. In this example ∂w∗/∂x = 1 in Figure 7 but
we shall show that, more generally, ∂w∗/∂x = t′ (x) /t′ (w). In Figure 8
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Figure 7: {A∗, E∗, w∗} for w∗ ∈ (x+A∗, w].
we see that the expected return to avoidance is negative for all w. The
variation of the expected marginal return to evasion in w is given at the
optimum by
∂2R
∂E∂w
∣∣∣∣
∂R(A,E)
∂E =0
= −p (x) t′(w∗)t′(w −A− E)f ′′
As f ′′ > 0 at an interior w∗, it must hold that ∂2R/∂E∂w < 0, as seen in
the Figure.
We now formally investigate the comparative statics of the two cases
analysed above:
Proposition 8 In an equilibrium in which either A∗ or w∗ takes an interior
value the comparative statics of {A∗, p(x), w∗} are given as in columns 3 and 4
of Table 1.
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Figure 8: Expected marginal return to avoidance and evasion for w∗ ∈ (x+
A∗, w).
When A∗ takes an interior value the results in Table 1 (column 3) for the
comparative statics of p (x) are consistent with those obtained in Propo-
sition 7: the audit function is a decreasing function of declared income,
shifts downwards with increases in φ and s, and shifts upwards in w.
Moreover, ∂A∗/∂x can be written as
∂A∗
∂x
= −1− {[1− φ] f
′ − 1} t′ (x)
[wn − wh] t′ (x+A) f ′′ < −1,
with the implication thatE∗ is an increasing function of x (andA∗/E∗ is a
decreasing function of x). Whether A∗/E∗ is an increasing or decreasing
function of wealth depends on the shape of the tax function. If the tax
function is progressive or linear then it can be shown that ∂A∗/∂w > 1, so
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E∗must fall, but bothA∗ andE∗may rise if the tax function is regressive.
When w∗ takes an interior value, however, the audit function be-
comes independent of declared income (and this holds for any tax func-
tion). The audit function also becomes independent of w (as it is not
predicated on the wealthiest taxpayer) and of φ (as avoidance is domi-
nated by evasion as a means of reducing tax liability). In both types of
interior optimum a steepening of the penalty function shifts the audit
function downwards.
We now return to the question of the effects of a proportional increase
in marginal tax rates (a steepening of the tax function – again by means
of an anti-clockwise pivot about the intercept). Matching our finding
in Proposition 7 for the case of a corner solution, the findings in Table
1 predict the opposite of the Yitzhaki (1974) finding: as marginal tax
rates increase the tax authority must raise the audit function to main-
tain truthful reporting. This finding is of note as Yitzhaki’s result is not
only paradoxical intuitively, but much empirical and experimental evi-
dence finds a negative relationship between compliance and the tax rate
(see, e.g., Bernasconi et al. 2014, and the references therein).8 In interpret-
ing this result it is of importance to note that the Yitzhaki (1974) model
can be augmented with a constant utility cost due to social stigma – as in
our model – without affecting the direction of the relationship between
marginal tax rates and non-compliance.9 This difference between mod-
els is not, therefore, a part of the explanation of our differing findings.
8See also Piolatto and Rablen (2016) for a detailed analysis of Yitzhaki’s finding, and
when it is and is not overturned.
9If, however, social stigma is viewed as a monetary, rather than utility cost, then a nega-
tive relationship between compliance and the marginal tax rate can emerge in the Yitzhaki
framework when the stigma cost is sufficiently high (see, e.g., Al-Nowaihi and Pyle 2000).
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Rather, the reversal of Yitzhaki’s finding relies on the idea that, even
in cases where evasion becomes less attractive following an increase in
marginal tax rates, tax avoidance will become more attractive for sure.
Thus the overall incentives for non-compliance grow, even if the incen-
tives for evasion weaken.
We illustrate this point graphically in Figure 9, which shows the effect
on the expected marginal returns to evasion (RE) and avoidance (RA) of
a multiplicative shift of a (linear) tax function. Specifically, we increase
the marginal tax rate from t− = 0.2 to t+ = 0.7 in the model specifica-
tion used in Figures 3, 4, and5. The increase in marginal tax rates is seen
to increase the expected marginal return to avoidance, so that the overall
expected marginal return to non-compliance at the optimum is increased
(making p (x) higher). In this case the expected marginal return to eva-
sion does not uniformly increase or decrease, but rather evasion becomes
subject to stronger diminishing marginal returns (recall that evasion and
avoidance are inversely related for a fixed x, so the amount of evasion
increases from right to left in Figure 9).
3.5 Extensions
In this section we consider a range of realistic extensions to the model of
the previous section. As, however, these extensions reduce (often sub-
stantially) the tractability of the model, we proceed here with solved ex-
amples, rather than general analytic solutions. As a key feature of our
analysis is the incorporation of tax avoidance, we herein focus on the
case in which the incentive compatibility constraints bind for an interior
level of avoidance.
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Figure 9: Effect of a multiplicative shift in the tax function on the expected
marginal return to avoidance and evasion.
3.5.1 Optimal Auditing
We now revisit the finding of Chander and Wilde (1998) that regressive
tax functions are more efficient than progressive tax functions (in the
sense that they cost less to enforce). In Figure 10 we show p(x) for the
linear (t′′ = 0), regressive (t′′ < 0), and progressive (t′′ > 0) cases.10 As
in previous Figures, A∗ is interior for x < xˆ and A∗ = 0 for x ≥ xˆ. We see
that the audit function in the progressive case is everywhere above the
audit function in the regressive case. Hence, the model retains Chander
and Wilde’s finding regarding the desirability of regressive taxation from
an enforcement cost perspective. Our finding is not importantly altered
if we instead employ the alternative formulation of the model whereby
10The specific functions depicted are t(x) = 0.3x (linear case); t (x) = 0.3x − 0.01x2
(regressive case); and t (x) = 0.06x2 (progressive case).
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t (x+ E)− t (x) is considered the evaded tax and t (w)− t (w −A) is con-
sidered to be the avoided tax.
Figure 10: Audit function for a progressive, linear, and regressive tax func-
tion.
3.5.2 Risk Aversion
So far we have restricted the utility function to be linear. More gener-
ally, however, much evidence points towards risk aversion, which im-
plies a utility function satisfying U ′′ < 0. Figure 11 illustrates p(x) when
taxpayers are risk neutral (U(x) = x) and when they are risk averse
(U(x) = x2/3). The audit function under risk aversion is seen to lie ev-
erywhere below the equivalent function when taxpayers are risk neutral.
To understand this finding we apply Jensen’s inequality to the condition
R (A∗, E∗) = 0 to obtain
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Figure 11: Effect of risk aversion.
p (x)Ua + [1− p (x)]Un = Uh ≤ U (p (x) [wa − S] + [1− p (x)]wn)
This inequality implies that wh ≤ p (x) [wa − S] + [1− p (x)]wn, which
is equivalent to p (x) ≤ [wn − wh] / [wn − wa + S]. Under risk neutrality
this inequality binds, so p (x) must necessarily lie below the risk neutral
level when risk aversion is introduced.
Furthermore, the audit function under risk neutrality is steeper than
under risk aversion. Under risk neutrality an increase in declared income
affects the taxpayer’s payoff by the difference between the expected marginal
return from truthful declaration and the expected marginal return of the
lottery associated with under-declaration. However, if the taxpayer is
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risk averse, the expected marginal utility of an increase of x will also fac-
tor (positively) the reduction of risk. Hence, p(x) in the risk aversion case
is less sensitive to increases in the amount declared.
3.5.3 Variable Social Stigma
We now relax the previous assumption of a constant utility cost of social
stigma by allowing for this cost to contain a variable component. We
write
S (w − x) =
{
0 if x = w;
s+ ψ[w − x] > 0 otherwise.
where ψ ≥ 0. When ψ = 0 we recover the specification of S (·) used in the
previous section. Figure 12 compares the audit function in the two cases:
one with a constant social stigma (s = 3, ψ = 0) and one with variable
stigma (s = 3, ψ = 0.9). As can be seen from the Figure, the increase in ψ
causes p(x) to shift downward and become flatter. While the first effect is
due to the absolute increase of the stigma cost, the second one is caused
by variation in the marginal stigma cost. Indeed, for a unitary increase
of declared income x, the taxpayer reduces his stigma by an amount ψ,
hence, the reduction in p(x) following an increase x is smaller the higher
is ψ. In this way, holding the level of stigma constant, stiffer deterrence
is needed when the stigma cost is dependent on evaded liabilities so as
to counteract the stigma-relieving effect of an increase in the declaration.
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Figure 12: Effect of a variable component to social stigma.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated how accounting for the ability of indi-
viduals to avoid tax, as well as to evade tax, alters the conclusions for
optimal auditing of models in which only tax evasion is possible. The
nature of the avoidance activity we consider is not explicitly prohibited
by law, but is unacceptable to the tax authority. Accordingly, if the tax
authority learns of the avoidance, it moves (successfully in our model) to
outlaw it ex-post.
Some key features of the literature that considers only evasion are
preserved: we find that the audit function is a non-increasing function
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of declared income and, as in Chander and Wilde (1998), lower enforce-
ment is required to enforce a regressive tax than to enforce a progres-
sive tax. The model does, however, also yield new insights, in particular
around the relationship between tax compliance and marginal tax rates.
The evasion-only literature has encountered the so-called ”Yitzhaki puz-
zle” whereby stiffer marginal tax rates decrease incentives to be non-
compliant. In our framework, however, the opposite applies: incentives
to be non-compliant increase with marginal tax rates. The key to this re-
sult is that the incentives to avoid tax unambiguously increase following
a raise of marginal tax rates. Thus, even though the incentives for eva-
sion may worsen, nonetheless, the tax system becomes more costly to en-
force, and overall compliance falls unless enforcement is stiffened. The
theoretical result of a direct relation between tax rates and both avoid-
ance and evasion matches the finding of Kleven et al. (2011). However,
empirical investigations considering the relation between tax rates and
non-compliance present mixed results. Further evidence of a positive
link between the two has been reported empirically by Chiarini et al.
(2013) while a negative one is presented in Slemrod (1985) and Feinstein
(1991). Notwithstanding, we would like to stress that the field experi-
ment of Kleven et al. 2011 benefits from a “designed” exogenous varia-
tion in tax rates that greatly improves the reliability of their inquiry. It
would be of interest to compare our results with experimental evidence,
unfortunately, to our knowledge there are no studies whose setting allow
for both evasion and avoidance to be investigated.
A number of policy implication may be derived from the model. How-
ever, it is necessary to stress that, following the discussion in 3.3, our
main focus is the audit function and other variables are considered as
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given in the analysis (i.e., may vary only in the “long-run”).
Indeed we are able to understand further questions such as ”which
taxpayers are the most difficult (expensive) to make compliant?”; and
”should tax auditing be geared to preventing avoidance or evasion?” On
the first question, we find that in plausible circumstances it is the wealthi-
est taxpayer who is the most difficult to make compliant. While we know
of no direct empirical evidence on this matter, our result chimes with the
findings of attitudinal research regarding perceptions of the compliance
of the rich (e.g., Wallschutzky 1984; Citrin 1979). The answer to the sec-
ond question depends critically on (i) the level and shape of the penal-
ties for evasion; and (ii) the competitiveness of the market for avoid-
ance schemes (for this determines the share of the possible proceeds from
avoidance that must be paid as a fee). If the penalty function is linear or
concave then, irrespective of the tax function, a non-compliant taxpayer
will engage purely in avoidance, or purely in evasion. Thus enforcement
is focused entirely on one form of non-compliance or the other. When,
however, the penalty function is convex (which seems quite likely em-
pirically, given that smaller cases of tax evasion are typically punished
through fines, but larger cases are punished through prison sentences) a
non-compliant taxpayer may simultaneously want to avoid and evade
tax, so enforcement must reflect both of these possibilities. We have
shown that a taxpayer’s preferred mix of avoidance and evasion moves
in favour of avoidance as reported income decreases, as the competitive-
ness of the market for avoidance schemes increases, and as the social
stigma associated with tax non-compliance falls.
Furthermore, the model provides useful insights on the effect that
some “long run” parameters have on revenue collection costs. Fiscal
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variables directly affect collection efficiency: lower marginal tax rates
and a reduced progressiveness of the tax schedule decrease the cost of
revenue collection. A stiffer enforcement of tax laws imposing (rela-
tively) high fines would allow for a reduction of enforcement costs. Fi-
nally, specific characteristics of taxpayers’ population, i.e., a marked risk
aversion or a high level of social stigma, would improve collection ef-
ficiency. However, it is necessary to note that enforcement of tax laws
represents only one of a government targets. Indeed, the first part of the
“long run” variables here considered plays a major role with respect to
other government goals (economic policy, redistribution, enforcement,
etc.) while the latest one would be barely affected by government in-
tervention. Hence, the derivation of normative implication from the in-
sights provided by the model must account for its partial-equilibrium
nature and should be performed with caution.
We finish with some avenues for future research. First, it would be
of interest to allow for imperfect audit effectiveness, as in Rablen (2014),
Snow and Warren (2005a,b), for it might be that evasion and avoidance
differ in the amount of tax inspector time required to detect them. Sec-
ond, it might also be of interest to model more carefully the market for
avoidance. In practice there are a range of providers of tax advice, rang-
ing from those that offer solely tax planning, to those that are willing to
offer aggressive (or even criminal) methods, making it important to un-
derstand the separate supply- and demand-side effects. As noted before,
the literature does not provide any experimental study considering both
avoidance and evasion. Further research along these lines would im-
prove our understanding of non-compliance decision providing valuable
insights to enhance deterrence policies. A last suggestion is to explore the
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effects of different forms of avoidance. We assume that avoidance per-
mits some amount of income to be hidden from the tax authority, but an
alternative modelling approach might be to assume that it allows some
amount of income to be taxed at a lower rate.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 6: The proof follows immediately from (4), (5) and
(6).
Proof of Proposition 7: Differentiating in (7) we obtain that, if A∗ = 0,
then
∂p(x)
∂w
=
t′(w) [1− p (x)] f ′
f + s
> 0;
∂p(x)
∂x
= − [1− p (x) f
′] t′(w)
f + s
< 0;
∂p(x)
∂s
= − p (x)
f + s
< 0;
∂p(x; εf)
∂ε
= −p (x) f
f + s
< 0;
∂p(x, εt)
∂ε
= p (x) [1− p (x) f ′] > 0;
∂p(x)
∂φ
= 0.
The comparative statics when A∗ = w − x follow similarly.
Proof of Lemma 1: We first prove p (x) f ′ < 1 From (14), (16) and (18),
if there exists a wˆ ≤ w such that p(x;A,w) attains the value p(x;A, wˆ) =
[f ′ (t (wˆ)− t (x+A))]−1 then p(x;A, wˆ) = maxw p(x;A,w) – for if (13)
defines a maximum in A, as assumed, then (13) defines a maximum in
w. p(x;A, wˆ) is maximised in A when Aˆ = 0 (as f ′′ > 0 for there to be
an interior A∗), so wˆ 6= w∗ for, by assumption, if it were that wˆ = w∗
then p(x;A, wˆ) would be maximised for an interior value of A. Hence
we have [f ′ (t (wˆ)− t (x+A∗))]−1 > p(x;A∗, w∗) = p (x). As this will
hold for every wˆ, we have p (x) f ′ < 1. If ∂p(x;A,w)/∂w > 0 every-
where then there does not exist a wˆ ≤ w such that ∂p(x;A,w)/∂w =
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0. We note that it cannot be that ∂p(x;A,w)/∂w < 0 everywhere as
∂p(x;A,w)/∂w|A=w−x=0 = φt′ (x) / [s+ f (0)] > 0. In this case p(x;A,w)
is maximised atw = w and satisfies p(x;A,w) < [f ′ (t (w)− t (x+A))]−1.
An analogous argument to that above then establishes that p (x) f ′ < 1.
Then, from (15), we may set p(x) = φ [f ′ − 1]−1 in p (x) f ′ < 1 to obtain
[1− φ] f ′ > 1. That p (x) < 1− φ follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 8: The comparative statics of a pivot around (z, f (z)) =
(0, 0) are found by writing f (·) as εf (·), differentiating with respect to
ε, and then examining the resulting derivative as ε → 1. The pivot of
the tax function is performed analogously. The comparative statics of a
shift of the tax function are found by replacing t (·) with t (·) + ε, differ-
entiating with respect to ε, and then examining the resulting derivative
as ε → 0. When A∗ ∈ (0, w − x) we use the implicit function theorem in
(13) to obtain:
sgn
(
∂A∗
∂s
)
= − sgn (φt′(A+ x)) < 0;
sgn
(
∂A∗
∂φ
)
= − sgn (f + [t(A+ x)− t(x)]f ′ + s) < 0;
sgn
(
∂A∗
∂w
)
= sgn
(
[1− φ]f ′ − 1 + [wn − wh]f ′′) > 0;
sgn
(
∂A∗
∂x
)
= − sgn({[1− φ]f ′ − 1} t′(x) + [wn − wh]t′(A+ x)f ′′) < 0;
sgn
(
∂A∗(εf)
∂ε
)
= sgn(sφ+ t(w)− t(x)) > 0;
sgn
(
∂A∗(εt)
∂ε
)
= sgn([t(w)− t(A+ x)][wn − wh]f ′′+
{[1− φ]f ′ − 1}[t(w)− t(x)] > 0;
and when w∗ ∈ (x, x+A) we use the IFT in (14) to obtain
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sgn
(
∂w∗
∂s
)
= sgn (t′(w∗)) > 0;
sgn
(
∂w∗(εf)
∂ε
)
= − sgn
(
st′(w∗)
[f + s]2
)
< 0;
sgn
(
∂w∗
∂x
)
= sgn
(
t′(x)
t′(w∗)
)
> 0;
sgn
(
∂w∗
∂w
)
= sgn (0) = 0
sgn
(
∂w∗(εt)
∂ε
)
= − sgn
(
f ′′t′(w∗)
[f ′]2
)
< 0;
sgn
(
∂w∗
∂φ
)
= sgn(0) = 0.
Turning to p (x), we use the IFT in (2) along with (13) or (14) to obtain
sgn
(
∂p(x)
∂s
)
= − sgn(wn − wh) < 0;
sgn
(
∂p(x; εf)
∂ε
)
= − sgn([wn − wh]f) < 0;
sgn
(
∂p(x)
∂x
)
=
{
− sgn
(
1−p(x)−φ
wn−wc+s
)
< 0 if A∗ ∈ (0, w − x) ;
sgn(0) = 0 if w∗ ∈ (x, x+A) ;
sgn
(
∂p(x)
∂w
)
=
{
sgn({[1− φ]f ′ − 1}) > 0 if A∗ ∈ (0, w − x) ;
sgn(0) = 0 if w∗ ∈ (x, x+A) ;
sgn
(
∂p(x; εt)
∂ε
)
=
{
sgn([1− φ]f ′ − 1) > 0 if A∗ ∈ (0, w − x) ;
sgn(0) = 0 if w∗ ∈ (x, x+A) ;
sgn
(
∂p(x)
∂φ
)
=
{ − sgn ([1− φ]f ′ − 1) < 0 if A∗ ∈ (0, w − x) ;
sgn(0) = 0 if w∗ ∈ (x, x+A) ;
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Chapter 4
Italian municipalities
efficiency:
A conditional frontier
model approach
4.1 Abstract
In most developed countries local governments are responsible for a rel-
evant share of the public services. However, the assessment of local gov-
ernment efficiency is a complex task that must account for the hetero-
geneity of local conditions. Hence, the estimation of relative efficiencies
must factor in for the impact of contextual and exogenous variables on
the production process. In this paper, we develop a composite local gov-
ernment output indicator with an unprecedented coverage of the pro-
ductive activities performed by the major Italian municipalities. Using
the output indicator along with balance sheet data of the expenses as an
input, we apply conditional frontier models to provide an assessment of
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municipalities efficiency scores. In the first stage, we evaluate the degree
of improvements attainable by any municipality with respect to the rele-
vant ”best-practice” frontier. In the second stage, we investigate the role
of non-discretionary inputs on performance.
4.2 Introduction
Local governments, especially in developed countries, provide for a siz-
able part of the public good and services supply. The considerable amount
of public spending and decision making attributed to local governments
calls for an evaluation of their performances. Indeed, efficiency assess-
ment of local governments may provide meaningful information to nu-
merous agents, first among others, the central government, which is in-
terested in the design of performance-based transfers and constraints for
the local level. In fact, the decentralization of both taxation and provi-
sion determines different effective tax bases and expenditure needs de-
pending on potential spill-overs (Oates 1999) and local socio-economic
dimensions. Hence, federal taxes are usually integrated with transfers
from the central government based on fiscal efficiency and fiscal equity
considerations (on the topic, see Prud’homme 1995; Oates 2005 and Shah
2012). Measures of performances may then be used, along with the socio-
economic composition and past expenditures, to determine transfers and
constraints imposed on local branches (Oates 1999; Bordignon 2001; Lock-
wood and Porcelli 2013).
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Jilles Saint-Paul and Andrea Vindigni for in-
sights and helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript. We thank Simone
Faggi and Ivan Marzocco whose first-hand experience greatly improved our understand-
ing of municipality structure. Any errors are our own and those we thank may not agree
with the interpretations provided in this paper.
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Moreover, local politicians may take advantage of efficiency assess-
ments as a relevant information on the production function of the local
bureaucratic apparatus. This information may be used to better evaluate
the electoral returns offered by different options to increase, therefore,
their political power (see Brennan and Buchanan 1980; Besley and Case
1995; Persson et al. 1997; Besley and Coate 2003) and/or to implement
policies to attract mobile factors of production (on the determinants of
firm localization, see Papke 1991; Patel and Vega 1999; Buettner and Ruf
2007).
Finally, efficiency assessment would provide voters with a signal of
the managerial skills of the local incumbent (see the seminal contribution
by Seabright 1995 and, more recently, Besley and Smart 2007). While in
the literature it is disputed whether additional information would result
in positive or negative net welfare effects (see Ferejohn 1986; Baron 1994;
Dewatripont et al. 1999; Besley and Smart 2007), it is apparent that the
electorate, or at least a part of it, is interested in the matter.
Evaluation of allocative efficiency may be performed using both in-
put and output quantitative indicators along with unit prices as weights.
However, in the municipalities case, market prices for outputs are usu-
ally not available. To overcome this issue, literature proposes to estimate
the production function frontier (parametrically or non-parametrically)
and to derive technical efficiency scores on the basis of relative distances
of inefficient observations from the frontier (see e.g. Farrell 1957; Dorf-
man et al. 1958; Charnes et al. 1979). Although the use of paramet-
ric estimation would enhance estimation efficiency, we adopt the non-
parametric approach due to the lack of a convincing theory in the litera-
ture on the true form of the production function (or of the distribution of
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inefficiencies) for municipalities. The non-parametric framework offers
two main models, the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free
Disposal Hull (FDH), where the main differences between the two ap-
proaches are related to the fact that the former requires i) the assumption
on the convexity of technology to hold, and ii) presents a better rate of
convergence (see the seminal work of Deprins et al. 1984 and, among the
latest contributions, Kneip et al. 2011). In Daraio and Simar (2007b) it is
provided a test to perform a data-driven choice between the two models.
The heterogeneity of exogenous conditions faced by the unit of in-
terest has a deep effect on efficiency evaluation and, if not considered
in the estimation, leads to biased and unfair efficiency measures: some
units score poorly because they are impaired by exogenous factors, while
other result efficient without merit. Firms may deal with the exogenous
conditions by changing their location in search of the most “suitable”
one for the production process (Kravis and Lipsey 1982; Wheeler and
Mody 1992; Flores and Aguilera 2007). Conversely, municipalities can-
not exploit the relocation option and the effect of external variables is
arguably even more pronounced. The methodologies proposed to ac-
count for non-discretionary variables in the non-parametric setting usu-
ally entail multi-stage models. In the first step an initial measure of ef-
ficiency is computed, while in the second step the effects of exogenous
factors are estimated and washed out from the initial efficiency scores
(see among others: Loikkanen et al. 2005; Balaguer-Coll and Prior 2009)
by means of different econometric techniques, usually OLS, censored
regression or Tobit models. However, Simar and Wilson (2011b) show
the inconsistency of many of these methodologies and in Simar and Wil-
son (2007) a theoretically sounding model, which entails a bootstrapped-
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DEA coupled with Tobit regression, is proposed. Nevertheless, the last-
mentioned method requires the separability condition to hold, namely:
“the support of the output variables does not depend on environmen-
tal variables” (Simar and Wilson 2011b, p. 207) and hence, neither the
shape nor the level of the boundary of the attainable set should vary
with the exogenous factors. Whether the separability condition holds or
not can be assessed by means of the test proposed in Daraio et al. (2010),
but it has to be noted that its requirement is rather strong. This restric-
tion has been relaxed thanks to a methodology presented in Daraio and
Simar (2005) and Daraio and Simar (2007b) that only requires the par-
tial separability condition to hold, namely: “the shape of the bound-
aries production frontier would not change with the level of output”
(Badin et al. 2012, p. 821). This approach introduces the exogenous fac-
tors directly in the first step, i.e. in the bootstrapped-conditional-DEA
(or bootstrapped-conditional-FDH), and then performs a second step by
means of a smoothed regression to evaluate the mean/variance effects of
exogenous variables on the efficiency scores.
The non-parametric frontier estimation has been applied to a wide
rage of topics (for a thorough survey see Emrouznejad et al. 2008 and the
references therein). Among the literature on municipality efficiency, one
strand is focused on a particular local service e.g., fire protection (Kris-
tensen 1983; Bouckaert 1992), garbage collection services and solid waste
management (Bosch et al. 2000; Worthington and Dollery 2001; Sarkis
and Dijkshoorn 2007; Garcı´a-Sa´nchez 2008; Huang et al. 2011; Rogge and
De Jaeger 2012), general administration and register offices (Kalseth and
Rattsø 1995; Settimi et al. 2014), infrastructure and equipment (Prieto
and ZofIo 2001), police services (Carrington et al. 1997; Diez-Ticio and
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Mancebon 2002; Garcia-Sanchez 2009; Verschelde and Rogge 2012), pub-
lic library services (De Witte and Geys 2011), urban public transportation
(Pina and Torres 2001; Boame 2004), or water management (Picazo-Tadeo
et al. 2009; Gupta et al. 2012). Conversely, another strand evaluates global
performances, i.e. it considers a more comprehensive list of goods and
services provided by local governments; this literature includes applica-
tion to numerous countries, such as: Australia (Worthington 2000), Bel-
gium (De Borger and Kerstens 1996; Geys 2006; Ashworth et al. 2014),
Brazil (De Sousa and Stosˇic´ 2005), Finland (Loikkanen et al. 2005), Ger-
many (Geys et al. 2010; Kalb et al. 2012), Greece (Athanassopoulos and
Triantis 1998; Doumpos and Cohen 2014), Italy (Boetti et al. 2012; lo
Storto 2016), Japan (Nijkamp and Suzuki 2009), Portugal (Afonso and
Fernandes 2006, 2008, Da Cruz and Marques 2014), and Spain ( Balaguer-
Coll et al. 2007; Benito et al. 2007; Gimnez and Prior 2007; Balaguer-Coll
and Prior 2009; Balaguer-Coll et al. 2010; Benito et al. 2010; Cordero and
Pedraja-chaparro 2016), and USA (Grossman et al. 1999).
Given data availability and the difficulties arising from the imputa-
tion of general inputs to particular services, the present study considers
the whole set of functions undertook by Italian municipalities to provide
an appraisal of local government efficiency. In the scientific literature,
the closest analysis to the present one are Boetti et al. (2012) and lo Storto
(2016). While the latter contribution computes an efficiency assessments
for (almost) the same set of municipalities here considered, the former
one is focused on Piemonte’s municipalities only. These studies employ
Stochastic frontier Analysis and a two-stage DEA-Tobit as methodology
with lo Storto 2016 also providing confidence intervals for DEA estimates
by means of bootstrapping (Simar and Wilson 2007).
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While far from being complete, the literature review here proposed
highlights the importance given by the scientific community to the non-
parametric measure of efficiency for the evaluation of local government
performance. The present work implements state-of-the-art methodolo-
gies in the field (an organic presentation is provided in Ba˘din et al. 2014)
to compute an efficiency assessment for the major Italian municipalities.
To this end, a data set with an unprecedented coverage of local govern-
ment interventions is developed along with a rich set of variables to ac-
count for the exogenous conditions. Three different external/exogenous
dimensions are investigated. To provide a sound representation of the
applied methodology we consider geographical conditions, i.e. we study
whether physical constraints impact on the level of attainable efficiency.
We introduce an adjusted measure of altitude to account for this dimen-
sion, that is, for each municipality we consider the joint effects of the
level of altitude and its variability in the municipality territory. There-
fore, we test whether being in a territory characterized by a high level
of altitude and/or of dispersion (i.e. a high mix of mountains, hills and
level ground) may impact as an unfavourable input for the provision of
local public goods and services. We also introduce a measure of social
environment, i.e. we investigate whether efficiency scores are influenced
by the level of crime in the municipality. To this end, we take into ac-
count the average number of crimes reported per thousand residents in
a three years timespan before 2011. The characteristics of the resident
population depend on many socio-economic drivers and both local and
central policies affect migration net-flows and the local social environ-
ment alike. However, we argue that this is a viscous process, which we
assume requires at least a couple of years to modify the local social condi-
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tions. We expect that the sign of this relationship is negative, i.e. being in
an unfavourable social environment (more crimes per inhabitant) nega-
tively affects the provision by municipalities of an efficient mix of inputs
and outputs. Finally, we opt for a measure of indebtedness to gauge the
potential effects of financial constraints. We use the average values of
the stock of municipality debt over an interval of four year prior to the
computation of the efficiency scores to investigate the effect of per-capita
local debt on efficiency frontier. One of the major dangers in a decen-
tralised fiscal system is the presence of soft budget constraints (SBC), i.e.,
the inability of the central government to credibly rule out the possibility
of bailout in case of local default. In presence of SBC, local branches of
government have an incentive to increase their debt above the optimal
level leading to suboptimal policies and increasing bankruptcy risk. In
order to manage this danger, the design of fiscal relations between the
multiple levels of government becomes crucial (Oates 2005). Financial
constraints imposed by the central government on the local levels has
been debated extensively in the public finance field and in the political
economy literature (i.e. Persson and Tabellini 1996; Rodden 2002). Espe-
cially relevant to the present study is the EU Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP) (see EC Commission 1990; EC Commission: The Commission Ser-
vices 1995; EC Commission 1996) that imposes constraints on the level of
debt. Academic debates on the optimality of SGP have ensued both at in-
ternational (Beetsma and Uhlig 1999; Buti et al. 2003; Feldstein 2005) and
at local levels (for the Italian case, see Balassone and Zotteri 2001; Brug-
nano and Rapallini 2009; Chiades and Mengotto 2015). We guess that the
estimation of the impact of the historical stock of debt on local efficiency,
along with the assessment of managerial efficiencies accounting for the
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level of local debt, may contribute to this debate.
Aim of the present work is to contribute to this literature with an in-
vestigation that exploits one of the most recent developments in the non-
parametric efficiency literature, namely, robust-conditional efficiency mea-
sures. Our findings indicate that municipalities characterized by a terri-
tory with an high altitude level and/or dispersion are hindered in their
provision activity. Thus, a fair rank of efficiency scores should consider
the location of municipality and the features of its territory. Similarly,
the social context seems to matter and negative social conditions are, as
expected, identified as an unfavourable input. Finally, the level of in-
debtedness appears to be marginal, having no visible effects on the like-
lihood to reach the efficient frontier. These unidimensional analysis il-
lustrate some of the diverse perspective that can be adopted while mea-
suring ”pure” managerial efficiency, i.e., measures where the effect of
external/exogenous variable is removed by means of a two-stage proce-
dure. We also provide a multi-dimensional study which combines both
physical and social measures. This enriched view mostly confirms the
univariate results and allows to identify conjoint effects neglected oth-
erwise besides providing a more thorough removal of exogenous effects
from managerial efficiencies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.3 describes the data set
and the corresponding sources; Section 4.4 presents the methodology in a
step-by-step procedure to highlight the construction of both conditional
and unconditional efficiency scores and to introduce the two-stage anal-
ysis; Section 4.5 shows the results on local efficiency scores and performs
unidimensional and multidimensional second-stage analysis; Section 4.7
concludes and presents avenues for furher research.
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4.3 Data Description
Our study focuses on performance evaluation at year 2011. The reason
behind this choice relies on both data quality and coverage of the vari-
ables used to assess efficiency levels. Year 2011 represents a valuable
point in time to describe the status of Italian society since it corresponds
to the latest census made by the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT 2011).
Our units of interest (i.e. DMUs, Decision Making Units) are Italian
administrative centers. There are about 8,000 municipalities in Italy. We
select cities corresponding to the province capitals, hence the analysis
covers the most important municipalities in terms of both populations
and territory sizes. Among the 110 province capitals, 10 of them corre-
spond to unions of municipalities1. We prefer to discard these cases due
to data coverage and comparability issues with the other administrative
centers2.
The analysis presents a static ranking of Italian municipality3 efficien-
cies. Usually, the assessment of municipal efficiency levels is measured
relating local expenditures, as a whole or partitioned into budget items,
to a list of output targets (Worthington and Dollery 2000). Our frame-
work includes a list of inputs which stand for the amount of money (in
Euro) each DMU spends for its main functions. Inputs are retrieved from
the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs4. For each municipality, we use
1These province capitals are: Barletta-Andria-Trani, Carbonia-Iglesias, Forlı´-Cesena,
Massa-Carrara, Medio Campidano, Monza e della Brianza, Ogliastra, Olbia-Tempio,
Pesaro-Urbino, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola.
2For the same reasons, we drop Aosta due to the high number of missing values affect-
ing it.
3For simplicity, hereinafter we refer to the DMUs as municipalities.
4Data is available at the link: http://finanzalocale.interno.it/apps/floc.
84
financial statement items to compute the total expenditures for every
function. The list of functions that we include is5: i) general activities
related to administrative and control tasks; ii) local police; iii) education
and schooling; iv) infrastructures and transportation; v) environment; vi)
welfare. Hence, we consider the most relevant municipalities’ functions
for which corresponding outputs are available6. The construction of the
outputs vector is based on several sources7: ISTAT, Istituto Tagliacarne,
the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Italian Ministry of University
and Research, and Legambiente. For each input we attempt to provide a
parallel with the corresponding outputs. Due to the difficulty to identify
the (single) most appropriate output for each input, we prefer to consider
small lists of outputs for each input. Subsection 4.4.6 will explain how
outputs are treated to be included in the computation of the efficiency
scores. Below, Table 2 shows the list of inputs and the corresponding
outputs, while Table 3 exhibits the descriptive statistics for each input
and output.
Scholars study the impact on efficiency levels of a wide list of envi-
ronmental or context indicators (see e.g. De Borger and Kerstens 1996;
php/in/cod/4.
5There is a repartition of competencies among Italian State, Regions, Provinces (nowa-
days cancelled by the Law n.56 of 7 April 2014, but present in 2011) and Municipalities.
In September 2003 the Constitutional Law n.3 modified the Title V of Italian Constitution,
determining also the revision of the “Testo Unico degli Enti locali” (approved by d.lgs. 18th
August 2000, n.267), which represents the collection of regulations on local public entities.
6In addition, the omitted functions represent only a marginal part of municipality total
expenditures. These functions are: justice, management of cultural heritage, sport and
leisure, economic development, and provision of services like utilities. Other public bodies
are typically much more involved in these fields, where municipalities are usually in charge
of residual activities.
7ISTAT is the Italian Institute of Statistics. Istituto Tagliacarne belongs to the Italian
statistics system and it is focused on data sets from the Chambers of Commerce. Legambi-
ente is a leading environmental association in Italy.
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Table 2: Inputs-Outputs Definitions. We show in the first column the se-
lected inputs corresponding to the main municipality functions. Second col-
umn refers to the related outputs for each input, while third column stands
for the respective source of the output (Inputs are all retrieved from Italian
Ministry of Internal Affairs).
Inputs Outputs Outputs Sources
General activities related to Total Population ISTAT
administrative and control tasks
Local Police Number of Vehicles Ministry Internal Affairs
Number of Km Travelled Ministry Internal Affairs
Education and Schooling Number of Classes Ministry of University and Research
Number of Students Ministry of University and Research
Number of Meals Ministry Internal Affairs
Number of Applications for the Canteen Service Ministry Internal Affairs
Number of Satisfied Requests for the Canteen Service Ministry Internal Affairs
Infrastructures and Transportation Light Points ISTAT
Km of Lit Roads Ministry Internal Affairs
Km of Urban Roads Ministry Internal Affairs
Km of Extra-Urban Roads Ministry Internal Affairs
Users of Public Transport Service ISTAT
Number of Km Travelled by Public Transport Legambiente
Environment Power of Photovoltaic Solar Panels installed on Municipal Buildings ISTAT
Population Connected to Urban Wastewater ISTAT
Solid Waste Treated ISTAT
Welfare Home Help with Social Care Services: Disability ISTAT
Home Help with Social Care Services: Elderly ISTAT
Home Help with Social and Healthy Care Services: Disability ISTAT
Home Help with Social and Healthy Care Services: Elderly ISTAT
Cash Benefits for Delivery of Social and Healthy Care ISTAT
at Home: Disability
Number of Day-Nursery ISTAT
Number of Available Seats in Day-Nursery Ministry Internal Affairs
Day-Nursery: Number of Children Aged 0-2 Years Attending ISTAT
Infancy Day-Care Services
Number of Applications for the Day-Nursery Service Ministry Internal Affairs
Number of Satisfied Requests for the Day-Nursery Service Ministry Internal Affairs
Supplementary or Innovative Services for Infancy Day-Care Ministry Internal Affairs
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Table 3: Inputs-Outputs Descriptive Statistics. We report for each input
and output the corresponding values of: minimum, median, mean and max-
imum. Inputs are in thousands Euro. Outputs units are expressed in paren-
thesis.
min median mean max
INPUTS (in thousands Euro):
General activities related to administrative and control tasks 4983 22110 54730 986800
Local Police 990 4774 15050 392900
Education and Schooling 991 8406 20540 465100
Infrastructures and Transportation 556 8615 32180 812819
Environment 1525 17000 42110 928600
Welfare 2194 14180 37610 690700
OUTPUTS:
Total Population (Number of residents) 21642 88812 168274 2617175
Number of Vehicles 0 33 63 843
Number of Km Travelled (Thousands) 0 261 5296 470000
Number of Classes 210 616 1039 12684
Number of Students 4386 13252 22601 277814
Number of Meals 0 248766 678256 14784256
Number of Applications for the Canteen Service 0 2699 63998 4108200
Number of Satisfied Requests for the Canteen Service 0 2699 63994 4108200
Number of Light Points 2000 13156 21204 198863
Km of Lit Roads 0 297 477 7600
Km of Urban Roads 30 231 557 19516
Km of Extra-Urban Roads 0 200 612 29516
Users of Public Transport Service (Thousands) 87 4360 39138 1382392
Number of Km Travelled by Public Transport (Thousands) 130 2254 6965 159648
Power of Photovoltaic Solar Panels installed on Municipal 0 57 336 9003
Buildings (Kw)
Population Connected to Urban Wastewater Treatment (Number of residents) 237 77189 150656 2496000
Waste Collection (Tons) 10365 49778 99566 1697186
Home Help with Social Care Services: Disability (Number of users) 0 5016 11842 321913
Home Help with Social Care Services: Elderly (Number of users) 172 1073 2109 20937
Home Help with Social and Healthy Care Services: Disability (Number of users) 0 586 2935 49725
Home Help with Social and Healthy Care Services: Elderly (Number of users) 0 201 783 9596
Cash Benefits for Delivery of Social and Healthy Care 0 2267 8541 346535
at Home: Disability (Number of users)
Number of Day-Nursery 0 6 17 339
Number of Available Seats in Day-Nursery 0 250 610 13284
Day-Nursery: Number of Children Aged 0-2 Years Attending 89 1196 2418 34245
Infancy Day-Care Services
Number of Applications for the Day-Nursery Service 0 345 912 19016
Number of Satisfied Requests for the Day-Nursery Service 0 230 632 11562
Supplementary or Innovative Services for Infancy Day-Care (Number of users) 0 146 318 3907
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Byrnes and Dollery 2002; Balaguer-Coll et al. 2007; Schmidt 2008; Kalb
2010; Ammons 2014; Doumpos and Cohen 2014; lo Storto 2016, among
others), such as: the institutional framework (e.g. legal and regulatory
issues, political issues as authority and power), the social-cultural envi-
ronment (e.g. traditions, traits and behaviors of the population; demo-
graphic distribution), the legacy conditions (e.g. presence of financial
grants, fiscal constraints and historical level of debt), physical and nat-
ural conditions (e.g. climate, topography, geology as either resources or
constraints), the presence of economies of scale and economies of scope.
We condition municipalities’ efficiency scores on a list of external
variables representing three main domains of analysis: i) physical con-
straints, as represented by the mix effect of the altitude of the munici-
pality and the dispersion of its territory; ii) social environment, as ex-
pressed by the level of crime; iii) budget constraints, as synthesized by
the historical stock of debts. These external variables stand for dimen-
sions over which municipalities are supposed to do not have discre-
tionary power. Following notation in literature, we indicate this list of
external/exogenous variables as the Z vector. Accounting for external
conditions that may impact on the effective capacity of municipalities to
reach better efficiency levels allows to isolate the pure municipalities’ ef-
ficiencies. Indeed, conditional measures evaluate DMU’s efficiency with
respect to the relevant (effectively achievable) frontier. This preliminary
step is then followed by a second stage analysis where the pure manage-
rial efficiencies are investigated. Section 4.4 will present and discuss the
assumptions behind the choice of the appropriate Z vector.
Here, we briefly anticipate that the assumption of partial separabil-
ity regarding the efficient frontier is crucial to compute conditional effi-
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ciency scores. Our external variables aim to include three distinct per-
spectives that are supposed to affect efficiency. Altitude and its variants
are common measures applied to differentiate municipalities based on
environmental conditions; here the intuition is that providing services
may be more difficult for municipalities located at higher altitudes or
with a heterogeneous composition of its territory. We employ measures
of the level and of the standard deviation of altitude elaborated by IS-
PRA8 developed using the Zonal statistics algorithm on ISTAT data. For
each municipality we multiply its altitude by the variance of municipal-
ity territory to take into account the presence of mountains, hills and
level ground. We label this indicator Compound Altitude. Crime is intro-
duced to consider the “quality” of the population; although one might
argue that even municipality managers can influence the overall level
of crime, we still add this dimension since we believe the amount of
crimes to be mostly related to comprehensive causes that are affected
only marginally by the role of municipality policies. Indeed, crime de-
terrence is hardly directly affected by local policies while it is the cen-
tral government the main actor in this context9. We compute the indi-
cator Crime Incidence as the average along the interval 2008-2010 of
per-capita crimes reported to the judicial authorities. Finally, we investi-
gate whether the stock of debts is a constraint to the provision of public
services. Obviously, there might be endogeneity related to the funding
sources that we include in the input vector. For this reason, we averaged
over the 4 years before 2011 in order to ameliorate endogeneity issues.
8Italian National Institute for Environmental Protection and Research.
9The National authority’s powers are exercised by the Minister of Public Affairs, to
which the Law n.121 of 1st April 1981 has assigned the responsibility for the enforcement
of public order and security.
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The corresponding indicator Funding is then normalized by the number
of residents. Summary statistics of the external/exogenous measures are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4: External Variables. First column reports the external/exogenous
measures, while following columns indicate the corresponding values of:
minimum, median mean and maximum. Last column shows the source
where the variable is retrieved. Funding is in euro per capita while Crime
Incidence is relative to one thousand residents.
min median mean max Source
Compound Altitude 1.42 12050 48860 515900 ISTAT
Crime Incidence 39.96 37.88 20.40 82.23 Ministry Internal Affairs, ISTAT
Funding 40.84 920.70 1018 3536 Ministry Internal Affairs, ISTAT
4.4 Methodology
In the following subsections it is illustrated the practical implementa-
tion of the efficiency measures’ estimation. Each subsection represents
a building block of our efficiency distribution analysis; therefore, for the
sake of clarity they are presented separately. Subsection 4.4.1 introduces
the estimation framework and explains how the production process is
defined both in the input × output Cartesian space and in the extended
space which includes the external/environmental variables. Subsection
4.4.2 presents the choice of the optimal bandwidth required to compute
the conditional efficiency scores; then, subsection 4.4.3 focuses on a robust
version of the frontiers helpful to investigate the impact of the environ-
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mental variables on the inefficiency distributions, while subsection 4.4.4
shows the local analysis of efficiency scores as a function of these ex-
ternal variables. Subsection 4.4.5 discusses how to include the external
variables in the efficiency analysis of DMUs to assess the effective man-
agerial capacities of municipality majors while subsection 4.4.6 explains
how data is processed to build the vectors used to compute the efficiency
measures. Finally subction 4.4.7 illustrates the procedure used to identify
and remove outliers.
4.4.1 General Setup
We briefly introduce the notation of the production process10. Let X ∈
Rp+ the p-dimension input vector used to produce the q-dimension out-
put vector Y ∈ Rq+. In addition, consider Z ∈∈ Rr as the r-dimension
vector of external or environmental variables that may affect the pro-
duction process. Denote by Ψ = {(x, y) can produce y} the marginal
unconditional attainable set, and let Ψz = {(x, y)|Z = z can produce y}
the conditional attainable set, where we can observe that Ψ =
⋃
z∈Z Ψ
z
so that, by construction, for all z ∈ Z , Ψz ⊆ Ψ. The role of Z can be
multiple, influencing the achievable values for the combinations (X,Y ),
potentially affecting the shape of the distribution of the attainable set, or
it may impact on the distribution of the inefficiencies without affecting
the boundaries of the efficient frontier. Z may even shows mix effects,
affecting both the shape of the frontier and the distribution of the ineffi-
ciencies, or, conversely, it can be also completely independent of (X,Y ).
10For a deep analysis on efficiency methodologies and estimation techniques, the inter-
ested reader can refer to Daraio and Simar (2007a).
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Daraio and Simar (2005) and Daraio and Simar (2007b) provide the
general setup for the analysis of the joint contribution of the tern (X,Y, Z).
Following previous work of Cazals et al. (2002), their formulation of the
conditional process can be described as:
H(x, y|z) = Prob(X ≤ x, Y ≥ y|Z = z) (1)
where H(x, y|z) is the probability for a DMU operating at level (x, y)
to be dominated by other DMUs facing the same environmental condi-
tions z. This joint distribution can be decomposed as:
HX,Y |Z(x, y|z) = FX|Y,Z(x|y, z)SY |Z(y|z) (2)
where FX|Y,Z(x|y, z) = Prob(X ≤ x|Y ≥ y, Z = z) and Equation 2
holds for all y such that the conditional survival function SY |Z(y|z) =
Prob(Y ≥ y|Z = z) > 0. Hence, the achievable couples (X,Y ) given
Z = z determine the support of H(x, y|z), that is Ψz . Similarly, the un-
conditional process can be represented as HX,Y (x, y) = Prob(X ≤ x, Y ≥
y) = FX|Y (x|y)SY (y), where FX|Y (x|y) is the conditional distribution
function of X and SY (y) is the corresponding survival function of Y .
Literature proposes several measures to gauge the distance of a DMU
operating at levels (x0, y0) to the efficient frontier (see for instance De-
breu 1951; Fa¨re et al. 2013; Farrell 1957; Shepherd 1970). In our setup,
we rely on the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) estimator which is based on the
free disposability assumption for Ψ and does not assume convex tech-
nologies as, indeed, required in the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
The FDH estimator of Ψ for the sample X = {(Xi, Yi), i = 1, ..., n} is:
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ΨˆFDH = {(x, y) ∈ Rp+q+ |y ≤ Yi;x ≥ Xi, (Xi, Yi) ∈ X} (3)
where the efficiency estimators are computed using a “plug-in princi-
ple”, i.e. substituting the unknown quantities ΨFDH by their respective
estimated values ΨˆFDH . In our framework, we focus on how DMUs
manage their inputs to determine certain level of outputs, hence we fol-
low an input-oriented case, where the efficiency score of the DMU (x0, y0)
is evaluated by means of the distance from this point to the estimated
frontier of the input requirement set Cˆ(y) = {x ∈ Rp+|(x, y) ∈ ΨˆFDH}.
Hence, the estimated unconditional input efficiency score for DMU (x0, y0)
is defined as:
θˆFDH(x0, y0) = inf{θ > 0|(θx0, y0) ∈ ΨˆFDH} = inf{θ|(FX|Y (θx0|y0) > 0}
(4)
which can be estimated by solving the integer linear program
θˆFDH(x0, y0) = min{θ|y0 ≤
n∑
i=1
γiYi;
θx0 ≥
n∑
i=1
γiXi,
n∑
i=1
γi = 1;
γi ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, ..., n}
The nonparametric estimator in Equation 4 can be computed using the
empirical version of the unknown conditional distribution of FX|Y (x|y),
that is:
FˆX|Y,n(x|y) =
∑n
i=1 I(xi ≤ x, yi ≥ y)∑n
i=1 I(yi ≥ y)
(5)
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where I(·) is the indicator function which assumes value I(v) = 1
if v is true and 0 otherwise. Due to the presence of the equality in the
conditioning on Z in Equation 1, the conditional analog of Equation 4
requires some smoothing techniques. Daraio and Simar (2005) suggest
the following kernel estimator:
FˆX|Y,Z,n(x|y, z) =
∑n
i=1 I(xi ≤ x, yi ≥ y)K((z − zi)/h)∑n
i=1 I(yi ≥ y)K((z − zi)/h)
(6)
where K(·) is an univariate kernel defined on a compact support and
h > 0 is the corresponding bandwidth (Daraio and Simar 2005). Hence,
the estimation of the conditional efficient scores can be interpreted as a
restricted FDH program to points satisfying ||zi − z|| ≤ h∀i ∈ [1, r].
4.4.2 Optimal Bandwidth Selection
To select the optimal bandwidth, we follow the approach proposed by
Badin et al. (2010) who adapts and extends previous results in Hall et al.
(2011) and Li and Racine (2008). Basically, we are looking for the band-
width with the minimum Least Squares Cross Validation (LSCV) error
for every point (xi, yi, zi) i ∈ [1, n] where n is the number of observa-
tions11. The set of bandwidths where the optimal one is searched for is
generated in two stages. In the first one, unidimensional bandwidths
(one for Y and one for every dimension of Z) are created by considering
a grid of values. A desirable feature of the grid step is to ensure a similar
“precision” along the different dimensions in order to achieve a balanced
search in the mutidimensional space. Moreover, the biggest bandwidth
considered should be wider than the range of the values assumed by the
11Conveniently, in Badin et al. (2010) a MATLAB routine for the task is provided. Fur-
thermore, an equivalent code in R has been developed by us and available upon request
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variable considered, thus including all the observations along the dimen-
sion considered, in order to exploit the discriminatory power of the LSCV
procedure that: “[..] allows separating the influential from the irrelevant
factors, by assigning to the irrelevant ones large smoothing parameters
[..]” Badin et al. (2010, p. 639). Both features are implemented by multi-
plying the standard deviation of considered variable by a grid of values
in [0 + s, max (W )−min (W )σ(W ) ] with step equal to s
12. Finally, the second stage
is performed by taking all the possible ordered selections with repetition
of size dim(Y ) + dim(Z) among the unidimensional bandwidths thus
obtaining the multidimensional ones.
4.4.3 Partial Frontier
The presence of potential outliers might affect the estimation of the ef-
ficiency scores. To provide a complementary study on the impact of Z
on the efficiency distributions, we exploit partial frontiers (Daraio and
Simar 2007a) which give measures of efficiency that are robust to outliers
and extreme data points. In particular, we follow the order α-quantile
frontiers introduced by Daouia and Simar (2007). For any α ∈ (0, 1], the
order-α input efficiency score for a DMU operating at the level (x,y) is:
θα(x, y) = inf{θ|FX|Y (θx|y) > 1− α} (7)
which converges to the Farrell-Debreu input efficiency score θ(x, y)
when α → 1. Therefore, when θα(x0, y0) = 1 the corresponding DMU
is efficient at the level α × 100%, which means that this DMU is domi-
nated by DMUs generating more output than y0 with a probability 1−α.
12The step used in the current work is s = 0.1
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Conversely, when θα(x0, y0) < 1 the DMU (x0, y0) needs to decrease its
input to the level θα(x0, y0)x0 to reach the efficient frontier of α × 100%.
Finally, a DMU can be super-efficient with respect to the order-α13 fron-
tier when θα(x0, y0) > 1. The nonparametric estimator of the input ef-
ficiency score can be obtained using the plug-in procedure: θˆα,n(x, y) =
inf{θ|FˆX|Y (θx|y) > 1−α}, whose statistical properties14 have been pre-
sented in Daraio and Simar (2006).
4.4.4 Local Analysis
The environmental variables Z might influence the shape of the attain-
able frontier, thus conditional measures of efficiency appear more suitable
to assess the level of effort a DMU must face to reach efficient levels.
However, as pointed by Badin et al. (2010), DMUs should not be ranked
simply by their conditional efficient scores since the impact of Z on the
likelihood to reach the frontier may differ among different levels of Z.
Conversely, a preliminary investigation on the local impact of Z on ef-
ficiency can be done independently of the correspondent level of ineffi-
ciency for each DMU. In fact, once the conditional and the unconditional
efficiency scores have been computed, we can compare their ratio (RI ,
for the input-oriented case) following the approach introduced by Badin
et al. (2010):
13In the following, to facilitate readability and since no ambiguities are at stake, we will
refer to the order α-quantile frontiers using indifferently the terms: alpha frontier, partial
frontier and robust frontier.
14For finite sample, the order-α frontier does not include all the data points, being more
robust to outliers than the standard envelopment estimators like FDH or DEA. In Daouia
and Gijbels (2011a), Daouia and Gijbels (2011b) and Daraio and Simar (2007a) are reported
some guidelines to select the appropriate order of the partial frontier to obtain robust esti-
mates. The graphical analysis undertook to select the optimal alpha for the current work
are reported in section 4.8, see Figures 28-29-30
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RI(x, y|z) = θ(x, y|z)
θ(x, y)
=
||x||θ(x, y|z)
||x||θ(x, y) =
||x∂,zy ||
||x∂y ||
(8)
where x∂,zy and x∂y represent the projections of (x, y) on the conditional
and unconditional efficient frontiers, respectively, along the x-axis and or-
thogonally to y. Hence, the ratio15 RI shows the shift of the frontier in
the input orientation due to a certain impact of z and given a level y,
regardless the inherent level of inefficiency for the DMU (x, y) (i.e. the
modulus ||x||).
In addition, the same study can involve partial frontiers (see subsec-
tion 4.4.3), providing therefore robust estimates of the distribution of the
inefficiencies that complements the full frontier analysis. In particular, it
is useful to analyze the impact ofZ on partial frontiers because if Ψz = Ψ,
then Rα(z) can be used to study the local impact of Z on the shape of
the distribution of inefficiencies over a grid of values of α like 0.99, 0.95,
0.90,..., 0.50, providing also a robust estimator of the boundary when α
is close to 1. As pointed out by Ba˘din et al. (2014), the conditional aver-
age of RI can be analyzed to detect whether locally Z has a significant
impact on the boundary of the attainable set. Therefore, we define the
corresponding values for the mean and the variance as:
µz(P ) = E[R(X,Y |Z = z)] (9)
σ2,z(P ) = V[R(X,Y |Z = z)] (10)
15Consistent estimators of the ratios are obtained by plug-in procedures of the nonpara-
metric estimators of the efficient scores. The rate of convergence is κ = 4/((r + 4)(p+ q))
for the full frontier case, while for partial frontier the rate is lower: γ = 2/(r + 4). See
Daraio et al. (2010) for further details.
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where P is an arbitrary DGP which generates (X,Y, Z). Nonparamet-
ric tools are exploited to estimate µz(P ); below, we provide the frame-
work for a univariate continuous Z, while for the multidimensional case
see Ba˘din and Daraio (2011). Given a sample of n pairs (Zi, Rˆ(Xi, Yi|Zi)),
for i = 1, ..., n, the conditional average µz(P ) can be estimated as follows:
µˆz(P ) =
n∑
i=1
Wn(Zi, z, hz)Rˆ(Xi, Yi|Zi) (11)
where we use local linear estimators for the weights Wn(Zi, z, hz)
(Fan and Gijbels 1996), while the localization is tuned by a bandwidth of
appropriate size chosen using the LSCV criterion (Li and Racine 2007).
Finally, bootstrap procedures are applied to provide confidence in-
tervals useful to make local inference on the impact of variables Z on the
production process. We follow the methodology proposed by Ba˘din et al.
(2014) to compute the bootstrap confidence intervals of τˆ(z), since stan-
dard algorithm are not feasible because true R(Xi, Yi|Zi) are unknown
and pairs (Zi, Rˆ(Xi, Yi|Zi)) are not i.i.d.. Basically, we rely on the m out
of n procedure introduced by Simar and Wilson (2011a) to obtain an ap-
proximation of the sampling distribution τˆzn−τz(P ). A step-by-step pro-
cedure for the confidence interval is16:
1 Given the sample Sn = {(Xi, Yi, Zi)|i = 1, ..., n}, estimate both
the unconditional and the conditional input efficient scores, where for
the latter the selection of the bandwidth reflects the LSCV criterion
discussed in subsection 4.4.2, and determine the corresponding es-
16We rely on the formulation presented in the Appendix of Ba˘din et al. (2014) to high-
light the key points of the bootstrap procedure. For an in-depth explanation, besides the
references in this subsection see also Kneip et al. (2008), Kneip et al. (2011) and Politis et al.
(2001).
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timated ratios Rˆ(Xi, Yi|Zi).
2 Select the grid of values for Z, say {z1, ..., zk} used to compute the
nonparametric regression for τˆzjn for j = 1, ..., k, where the band-
width is chosen according to ASE.
3 For m < n and large B (here B = 2000, n varies depending on the
number of removed observations (due to missing data or ouliers)
between n = 83 and n = 9317, while m ranges from 50 to n − 1),
repeat the following steps from 3.1 to 3.3 for each replication b in
B.
3.1 Draw a random sample S∗m,b = {(X∗,bi , Y ∗,bi , Z∗,bi )|i = 1, ...,m}
without replacement from Sn, maintaining the bandwidth se-
lected in step 1 attached to the respective point (X∗,bi , Y
∗,b
i , Z
∗,b
i ).
3.2 Determine the m ratios Rˆ∗,b(X∗,bi , Y
∗,b
i , Z
∗,b
i ), for i = 1, ..., n as
in step 1. By doing so, rescale bandwidths obtained in step 1
multiplying them by the scale factor (n/m)1/(r+4).
3.3 Using the same technique as in step 2, estimate the nonpara-
metric regression over the points of the grid {z1, ..., zk}. Even
in this case, bandwidths of step 2 are rescaled by the scale fac-
tor (n/m)1/(r+4).
4 For each point j = 1, ..., k, compute α/2 and 1 − α/2 quantiles
(q
∗,zj
m;α/2, q
∗,zj
m;1−α/2) of theB bootstrapped values τˆ
∗,b,zj
m − τˆ b,zjn . Then,
determine the corresponding confidence intervals of τzj (P ) at each
point zj as:
17n = 93 for Z ∈ { Crime Incidence, Funding }, n = 89 if Z ≡ Compound Altitude,
n = 83 in the multidimensional investigation.
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τzj (P ) ∈ [τˆzj − (m/n)2/(r+4)q∗,zjm;1−α/2, τˆzj − (m/n)2/(r+4)q∗,zjm;α/2]
(12)
The selection of the optimal m for the subsampling is done also fol-
lowing Ba˘din et al. (2014). First, the steps three to four are replicated for
m ∈ [n/2, n − 1] obtaining the relative confidence intervals. Second, ac-
cording to Politis et al. (2001), we use the the average of the extremes
of the intervals (for every point Z considered by the grid selected in
point two) to evaluate a moving standard deviation18 as a measure of
the volatility associated with the considered m. We evaluated both the
m-s that minimize the volatility for each observation and the one that
minimizes the sum of volatility across all observation; the reported plots
shows only the second one due to the reduced noisiness of the estimates.
4.4.5 Second Stage Analysis
Literature proposes several approaches to evaluate the impact of exter-
nal variables on efficiency scores. Simar and Wilson (2007) and Simar and
Wilson (2011b) discuss potential pitfalls that can be related to the inclu-
sion of external variables in a second stage analysis framework, present-
ing some solutions to run a proper econometric analysis. In particular,
we briefly remark that if the separability19 condition does not hold, the
18the window that we selected is 15 given that the advised value of 3 resulted in noisy
estimates.
19The separability condition refers to the input × output space with the inclusion of the
Z space. It states that the enlarged set of attainable combinations is the Cartesian product
Ψ × Rr , where r stands for the r-dimensional vector of Z external variables. Hence, this
means that Z variables do not affect neither the attainable set Ψ nor the position of its
frontier, but simply influence the distribution of the DMUs far from the frontier. For details
see for instance Daraio and Simar (2007a).
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interpretation of the unconditional efficient scores is misleading and the
second stage analysis is therefore meaningless.
Here, we follow the approach introduced by Badin et al. (2010) where
we basically study the average effect of z on θ(x, y|z). Obviously, efficient
scores might be influenced by both y and z, but since the aim of this
method is to detect the marginal effects of Z this justifies the analysis of
E[(θ(X,Y |Z))|Z = z] as a function of z. As suggested by Badin et al.
(2010), we adopt the following regression model:
θ(X,Y |Z = z) = µ(z) + σ(z) (13)
where µ(z) = E[(θ(X,Y |Z))|Z = z], σ2 = V[(θ(X,Y |Z))|Z = z],
E[|Z = z] = 0 and V[|Z = z] = 1. µ(z) and σ(z) are estimated nonpara-
metrically: µ(z) by local constant methods (Pagan and Ullah 1999) which
involve local smoothing techniques for the selection of the bandwidths
with appropriate size (see Li and Racine 2007), while σ2(z) is estimated
by regressing the squares of the residuals obtained for the estimation of
µ(z) on Z (Fan and Gijbels 1996). Thus, µ(z) shows the average effect
of z on the efficiency scores, while σ(z) stands for the dispersion of the
efficiencies as a function of z.
As a matter of fact, the resulting residuals appear informative to ex-
press the unexplained portion of the conditional efficiency scores:
 =
θ(X,Y |Z = z)− µ(z)
σ(z)
(14)
In particular, if Z and  do not present a strong correlation,  repre-
sents the pure efficiency of DMU (x, y) since it is the cleaned off condi-
tional efficiency where location and scale effect due to Z are removed
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(Badin et al. 2010). Finally, we can use this quantity to evaluate the per-
formance of municipality managers: large  will refer to better perfor-
mance, while small values of  will represent poor managerial results.
However, the true input efficient scores are unknown and this implies
we can exploit only the set of n estimators θ(Xi, Yi|Zi). This means that
we have a sample of n pairs (Zi, θˆ(Xi, Yi|Zi)), for i = 1, ..., n, which we
use to estimate µ(z) and σ(z). θˆ(Xi, Yi|Zi) are estimators with nκ rate of
convergence, which imply that the estimator µˆn(z) is a consistent estima-
tor of µ(z) at a convergence rate equal to n4/((r+4)(p+q)) (for details see
Kneip et al. 2015).
4.4.6 Construction of the Input, Output and Environmen-
tal Vectors
In our setup, the set of attainable combinations (X,Y ) is circumscribed
to a simple representation in the Cartesian space where p = 1 and q = 1.
In doing so, we need to find a methodology to collapse all the collected
information for both inputs and outputs20. Inputs are expressed in mon-
etary values, so we sum up the expenditures for each function to get the
overall amount of money invested by each municipality to provide cer-
tain services.
The use of cost-related items to gauge municipalities performance is
widely accepted in the empirical literature. Current expenditures are
usually applied to obtain cost-efficient measures to assess municipality
efficiencies (see e.g. Afonso and Fernandes 2008; Rogge and De Jaeger
20Literature proposes some approaches to reduce the multi-dimensionality issue related
to the amount of inputs and outputs with respect to the sample size. The use of Principal
Component Analysis is suggested e.g. in Daraio and Simar (2007a). The idea of composite
indicators is also proposed in Afonso and Fernandes (2006) and Afonso and Fernandes
(2008).
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2013; Doumpos and Cohen 2014).
Conversely, outputs are expressed in different units and the amount
of outputs that we collected differ between municipality functions. In ad-
dition, within each function these outputs reflect different aspects of the
production process and we argue it would be unfair to select or discard
some of them. Hence, for the outputs we follow the approach introduced
by Afonso and Fernandes (2006) and Afonso and Fernandes (2008) and
we provide a synthetic indicator which aggregates variables coherently
to the correspondent municipality functions.
Since each variable has a particular dispersion, we normalize each
value (for each DMU) by subtracting its mean value and then dividing
this quantity by its standard deviation. Then, we sum up all these nor-
malized values within the same municipality function. Finally, we divide
by the effective number of variables which are available for that DMU
within that municipality function. In this way we take into account also
the event of missing values for some outputs. So, we end up with f
normalized values for each DMU, where f is the number of municipal-
ity functions. This measure resembles the computation of the t-score, so
that deviation from the mean value implicitly accounts for the disper-
sion of the variable considered. We adopt the label t-score hereinafter. In
formula, the t-score of DMU i for a certain municipality function is:
S∑
j=1
(Xij − µj)/σj
S
(15)
where S is the number of variables collected for DMU i for a certain
municipality function, Xij refers to the observation of DMU i for mea-
sure j, while µj and σj stand for the mean and the standard deviation
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of measure j, respectively. Therefore, each DMU will be characterized
by a specific t-score for every function. To guarantee that non-negative
values are considered in the FDH program, we simply shift t-scores cor-
responding to each municipality function by adding the absolute value
of the respective minimum. Finally, we reduce output dimensionality by
computing the mean values of the f t-scores for each DMU, so that any
municipality function is assigned the same importance.
4.4.7 Outlier Detection
Given that the efficient frontier is estimated by extreme points of the
sample, it follows that FDH measure (the same applies to DEA mea-
sure alike) is very sensitive to super-efficient outliers. As pointed out
by Simar (1996), the identification and removal of outliers when using
FDH methodology is crucial to the point that, may it be unworkable due
to peculiar circumstances, other estimation methods should be preferred
(such as stochastic frontiers). Building on the m-frontier developed in
Cazals et al. (2002), Simar (2003) proposes a ”Semi-automatic Warning
Procedure” that may be used to detect outliers and Daraio and Simar
(2007a) extended it to α-frontiers. The procedure is intended as a diag-
nostic tool to flag a set of observations that deserve closer inspection. For
every sample point the procedure computes the number of observation
dominating it and its ”leave-one-out” partial frontier (α or m) measure
of efficiency. The number of dominating units is relevant because it indi-
cates the number of points used to estimate the efficiency measure and
provides information on how close the point is to the edge of the sup-
port of the sample. Moreover, any sample point whose ”leave-one-out”
partial frontier measure is super-efficient (bigger than one in the input
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orientation or lower than one in the output one) when moving towards
the ”leave-one-out” full frontier (i.e., when α or m increases) stands out,
in efficiency terms, from the cloud of sample points and is considered
to be an extreme. Observations identified as extreme in both directions
(input and output) and with a small number of dominating units, are
therefore flagged potential outliers. Selection of an appropriate thresh-
old to identify super-efficient observation may be performed by com-
paring, for different value of the threshold, the behaviour of the ratio of
points above the threshold when the partial frontier converges to the full
one. In absence of outliers, the curve of above-the-threshold observa-
tions should converge approximately linearly to the percentage of points
having a leave-one-out FDH score greater than one (smaller than one for
the output-oriented case). Conversely, strong deviation from linearity
may be associated with the presence of outliers; a characteristic mark be-
ing the presence of an elbow effect consisting in sharp negative slope,
followed by a smooth decreasing one in the graph. Given that an outlier
could mask other outliers, the procedure of identification, verification
and removal of outliers is performed iteratively.
Remarkably, accounting for exogenous variables in the efficiency mea-
sure affects (through the bandwidths) both the set of dominating units
and the computed efficiency. Given a sample point, using conditional
measures defines the conditional set of dominating units as a subset of
the unconditional one whose points have distance, in the Z space, lower
than the observation bandwidth. While the unconditional set of dom-
inating units is informative with respect the position of an observation
in the Y space (for the input orientation case, X in the output one) the
conditional one provides analogous knowledge with respect to Z space.
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Hence, in the present article, both measures have been considered while
performing outlier identification. Outlier detection is undertook consid-
ering one exogenous variable at time leading to the identification of three
partially overlapped sets. For Compound Altitude the set is composed
by: Belluno, Biella, Bolzano, L’Aquila, Lecco, Pistoia, Sondrio, Reggio di Cal-
abria, Rieti, Trento; the variable Crime Incidence identifies as outliers:
Catania, Milano, Napoli, Palermo, Roma, Torino while for Funding the ob-
servation of: Catania, Genova, Milano, Palermo, Siena, Torino, are removed.
When performing multivariate analysis, the set of outliers considered is
the union of the univariate outliers of the Z considered. For brevity we
omit a part of the outliers identification procedure but we provide in sec-
tion 4.8 the graphs of ratio of super-efficient observation vs α before and
after the removal of outliers (see Figures 28-29-30).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Local Analysis
Local analysis shows how the Z vector affects the production process
of municipalities. We follow the methodology proposed by Badin et al.
(2012), so the resulting local effects of each z on the shift of the frontier in
the input-oriented framework can be analyzed by means of the full fron-
tier ratio RˆI(Xi, Yi|Zi). Partial frontiers ratios RˆI,α(Xi, Yi|Zi) will then
be used to remove the effect of extreme data points that can hide the true
efficiency levels. Finally, also the frontier with α = 0.50 is analyzed to
provide information on the effect of external measures on the middle of
the distribution of inefficiency scores. To investigate the role of each z
measure, we consider the marginal views of the conditional efficiency
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ratios on both levels of z and y, separately. We focus here on the impact
of each z individually, while in Section 4.5.4 we will show the impact
of the multi-dimensional case. In each local analysis, y stands for the
t−scores as introduced above in Section 4.4.6. Below, we summarize the
local effects of each z:
• z = Compound Altitude. As shown in Figure 13, there is not a
clear effect on the distributions of inefficiencies as a function of y.
This is more visible for the robust version of the frontier (α = 0.98).
The investigation of Figure 13 reveals also the presence of a mod-
est and increasing effect of z on the conditional efficiency scores
for both the full and robust versions of the frontier. However, the
median case shows a negative slope, suggesting the presence of
some favourable effects on the frontier corresponding to the mid-
dle of the distribution. The support of the attainable set seems to
slightly depend on Compound Altitude, but the probability of be-
ing far from the frontier (being less efficient) might be decreasing
for municipalities with higher values of z. It is worth noticing that
efficiency ratio seems not to be affected by y, meaning that there
is not interaction between the effect of Compound Altitude on the
frontier and the levels of y. This motivates the marginal analysis
which we will present in Sub-Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.
• z = Crime Incidence. The relationships between z and conditional
measures of efficiencies are positive in both the full and partial
frontiers (α = 0.99), thus supporting the interpretation that higher
107
levels of Crime Incidence act as an unfavourable input of the pro-
duction process (Figure 14). This is also confirmed by the plot cor-
responding to α = 0.50, which shows a slightly positive slope too,
albeit of lower magnitude. This suggests that Crime Incidence im-
pacts on the shift of the frontier and less on the distribution of in-
efficiencies. Also in this case, y does not show a visible effect on
the inefficiency ratio, meaning that there is not interaction between
y and the effect of Crime Incidence on the frontier. This supports
the marginal analysis which we will discuss in Sub-Sections 4.5.2
and 4.5.3.
• z = Funding. The role of y on the distribution of conditional effi-
ciencies is minimal as shown in Figure 15. Similarly, the effect of
Funding on conditional efficiencies appears to be absent as exhib-
ited in both the full and the partial frontiers (α = 0.98). However,
the distribution of inefficiencies as a function of z at the middle
of the distribution seems to exhibit a modest but positive relation-
ship. This suggests that Funding may affect distribution of ineffi-
ciencies and less the shift of the frontier. No interaction seems to be
present between y and the ratio of efficiency when conditioning on
Funding, supporting the marginal analysis which we will present
in Sub-Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.
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Figure 13: Compound Altitude. For each block, the first plot refers the
marginal impact of z on the efficiency ratios, while the second plot shows
the marginal impact of y. Blocks stand for: full frontier, robust version (α =
0.98) and middle distribution (α = 0.50), respectively.
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Figure 14: Crime Incidence. For each block, the first plot refers the
marginal impact of z on the efficiency ratios, while the second plot shows
the marginal impact of y. Blocks stand for: full frontier, robust version
(α = 0.99) and middle distribution (α = 0.50), respectively.
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Figure 15: Funding. For each block, the first plot refers the marginal im-
pact of z on the efficiency ratios, while the second plot shows the marginal
impact of y. Blocks stand for: full frontier, robust version (α = 0.98) and
middle distribution (α = 0.50), respectively.
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4.5.2 Confidence Intervals
Here we present and discuss the detection of the impacts of the Z ex-
ternal measures on conditional efficiencies. We follow the methodol-
ogy introduced in Sub-Section 4.4.4. As outlined above, this analysis
is meaningful since there is not interaction with the output y. Basically,
we attempt to assess the significance of Z measures on the output pro-
cess by applying a confidence interval built on a bootstrap procedure
(Badin et al. 2012). Hence, in Figure 16 for each measure z we present
its marginal effect (the continuous blue line) with the corresponding 95%
confidence intervals (the dotted red lines) on both the ratio RI(z) and its
robust analog Rα,I(z).
By construction, in the input-oriented scenario all the ratios are larger
than one for the full frontier case. Figure 16 reveals that Compound
Altitude presents a significant effect which is slightly increasing for higher
values of it. Hence, there is a modest but significant positive influence of
Compound Altitude on the attainable set of efficient levels. This means
that municipalities located in areas with a high mix of altitude levels and
dispersion is hampered in its provisioning activity. In addition, this ef-
fect is still present once we focus on the partial frontier. The graph for
Crime Incidence displays a higher variability, the ratio is stationary in
the first half of the Z distribution and then increases towards a higher
plateau. The estimates are more variable in this case but a significant
and increasing effect seem to be at stake along the whole distribution;
a similar pattern is shown by the robust version of the frontier. Hence,
Crime Incidence is playing an analogous role of Compound Altitude:
DMUs with higher values of crime tend to be less efficient. Finally, we
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notice that Funding does not play any role on both the full and partial
frontiers. Therefore, it seems that the structure of the municipality stock
of debt is not related to particular marginal effects, either as a favourable
or as an unfavourable impact. Conclusions may suffer from the presence
of potential outliers, however the analysis of the robust versions of the
frontiers reveals that significant effects of these Z measures are basically
confirmed. Clearly the presence of very high values for z may mask the
true effects of this external measure on the efficiency scores. These effects
seem to be reasonably disentangled by the application of the robust ver-
sion of the frontier. The marginal analysis suggests the presence of two
external measures, namely Compound Altitude and Crime Incidence,
which significantly impact on the output process. These measures act as
unfavourable inputs, thus motivating their inclusion in the second stage
analysis aimed to identify efficiency scores which are cleaned from these
external effects. In addition, we observe that the stock of debt (Funding)
presents a significant but flat impact on the efficiency scores. This means
that the burden of funding constraints related to the level of debt, which
incumbent municipality managers inherit from the past, does not seem
to discriminate efficiency performances.
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Figure 16: Bootstrapped Confidence Intervals. Plots in the rows refer to
Compound Altitude, Crime Incidence and Funding, respectively. Plots on
the left refer to the full frontier, while those on the right stand for the robust
case. Blue lines exhibit the marginal effects, while the dotted red lines stand
for the 95% confidence intervals.
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4.5.3 Second Stage Analysis
Local effects of the Z external variables on conditional measures of effi-
ciencies that are shown in Sub-sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 support the second-
stage analysis that we present below. We apply the nonparametric ap-
proach introduced by Badin et al. (2012) and discussed in Section 4.4.5.
Basically, the conditional efficiency scores are regressed against each ex-
ternal variable z in a location/scale model. Using this methodology it
is possible to characterize the local average effect of z on the conditional
efficiency, µ(z), while also estimating locally the dispersion of its dis-
tribution, σ(z), thus allowing for the presence of heteroscedasticity, in
formula: θ(X,Y |Z = z) = µ(z) + σ(z).
Since the effects of y values on the efficient frontier is not clear and
visible, we reasonably assume that partial separability is verified, thus
legitimating the second stage analysis. This allows us to isolate the pure
managerial efficiencies which we will express in terms of i. Notably,
unlike efficiency measures as FDH or DEA, i of DMUs characterized
by different levels of Z may be consistently ranked because the effect of
the exogenous variable has been accounted for.
We provide the second stage analysis for each external measure in
both its full frontier and robust version. Figures 17-19 will present these
results for each z separately. In particular, we will show: i) the average
(µ) effect of z and its dispersion (σ); ii) the estimated distribution of pure
efficiencies (i); iii) the correlation between pure efficiencies and the val-
ues of the selected external measure. This framework allows us to detect
the impacts of z on conditional efficiency scores and to assess whether i
are appropriate measures of efficiency.
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• Compound Altitude. Figure 17 shows that the average effect of
Compound Altitude is increasing in z, while the role of σ is mini-
mal, being almost flat and low along the entire range of z. These
behaviors seem to be persistent even in the robust version of the
frontier. The histogram of the estimated pure efficiencies  is shown
in the middle plot of Figure 17. The distribution of i is useful to
compare municipalities once the main effects of z are eliminated.
In fact, the DMUs on the left of the distribution are characterized
by a lower managerial efficiency than those at the right. The rank-
ing provided by i indicates the emergence of a bundle of efficient
municipalities, while a substantial subset of DMUs still result far
from the efficient conditional frontier. It has to be noted that the
comparison of the residuals is legitimate because the influence of
z has been removed from the conditional scores (Sub-Section 4.5.4
will specifically consider multiple Z to gauge managerial efficiency
using a multidimensional perspective). Finally, the scatterplot in
the right panel of Figure 17 shows the correlation between the es-
timated pure efficiencies i and the corresponding values of zi. An
appropriate second stage analysis would require this correlation to
be low, meaning that i can be used as a proxy for the pure man-
agerial efficiency free from location and scale effects due to z. Ac-
tually, the correlation is only 0.08 in the full case (0.10 in the robust
version), confirming that the regression successfully cleaned out
the relationship between zi and the conditional efficiency scores
given by Compound Altitude. The Pearson correlation between
these whitened scores and the original ranking based on the condi-
tional efficiency scores is 0.87, while the Spearman rho is 0.89 (for
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both the full and robust versions).
Figure 17: Second Stage Analysis: Compound Altitude The first panel
refers to the full frontier case, while the second one shows the effects on
the robust version. Plots on the left exhibit the location and scale effect due
to µ and σ; plots on the middle refer to the distribution of the managerial
efficiencies i; plots on the right show the correlation between i and the
corresponding z values.
• Crime Incidence. Figure 18 shows that the average effect of z is,
for the full and the partial frontier alike, slightly U-shaped in the
left part of the Z distribution with an increasing pattern on the
right. This is coherent with the findings presented in Figure 16 of
Sub-Section 4.5.2, where we observed that ratios were on a lower
plateau for low values of Z and on a higher one for higher Crime
Incidence values. Moreover, the role of σ is residual, being flat and
low along the entire range of z. The ranking based on the estimated
i results, therefore, similar to the one provided by the conditional
efficiency scores. The Pearson correlation between whitened effi-
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ciencies and conditional efficiency scores is 0.95 for both the full
and robust versions, while the Spearman rho is 0.89 and .88, re-
spectively. Even in this case, the second-stage analysis is based
on estimated pure efficiencies i which are poorly correlated to z
values (0.01 for both full and robust versions), hence, the result-
ing measures of managerial efficiency based on i has been nicely
whitened, thus providing a reasonable ranking of efficiency.
Figure 18: Second Stage Analysis: Crime Incidence The first panel refers
to the full frontier case, while the second one shows the effects on the robust
version. Plots on the left exhibit the location and scale effect due to µ and σ;
plots on the middle refer to the distribution of the managerial efficiencies i;
plots on the right show the correlation between i and the corresponding z
values.
• Funding. Figure 19 exhibits the impact of Funding. The first plot
reveals that its influence is almost negligible in terms of different
values of z, being substantially flat along the entire range of it.
Indeed, the bandwidth selected by means of LSCV in the second
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stage is large compared to the range of Z. Similar to the previous
variables, the role of σ is very marginal and the picture depicted
by the robust version of the frontier confirms the findings of the
full frontier case. The estimated distribution of i is, therefore, sim-
ply a standardised version of the distribution of conditional mea-
sures (Pearson correlation and Spearman rho are equal to 0.96 and
0.91 in the full frontier, while in the robust version they are almost
equal to 1 and 0.95 respectively). Still, the distribution of i is cor-
rect and the correlation between i and the corresponding zi values
confirms the absence of a clear relationship (the correlations are
−0.03 and −0.09 with respect to the full and robust case, respec-
tively). Those units that are on the left side of the distribution of
estimated i should deserve special attention to understand which
are the generating processes of their inefficiency levels. However,
it seems that Funding does not play the role of either favourable or
unfavourable input, which seems to be an odd result if interpreted
in terms of budget constraints that municipalities have to face to
respect fiscal stability requirements.
The unidimensional second-stage analysis provide separate perspec-
tives on efficiency scores cleaned from the impact of one external dimen-
sion at time. Figure 20 show rankings based on the different values of
i obtained from the second-stage analysis for both the full and partial
frontiers. To increase map readability, the efficiency of the municipal-
ity is imputed to the whole province it belongs to. The visualization
the managerial efficiencies belonging to different Z displays a peculiar
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Figure 19: Second Stage Analysis: Funding The first panel refers to the full
frontier case, while the second one shows the effects on the robust version.
Plots on the left exhibit the location and scale effect due to µ and σ; plots on
the middle refer to the distribution of the managerial efficiencies i; plots on
the right show the correlation between i and the corresponding z values.
pattern of the efficiency distribution. While some municipalities tend
to persistently rank at the top/bottom in every specification, a relevant
dispersion in the core of the distribution is displayed across different ex-
ogenous conditions.
Given the relevant and diverse effects of the different exogenous vari-
ables on managerial efficiency, we present in Section 4.5.4 an attempt
to account for more external variables at the same time; i.e., a multi-
dimensional second-stage analysis. This scrutiny allows to identify joint
effects neglected in the univariate analysis and to estimate better man-
agerial efficiencies since exogenous effects are more thoroughly washed
out. However, it has to be noted that increasing the number of envi-
ronmental variables considered reduces the precision of estimates and
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Figure 20: Maps of efficiency levels for single external dimension. The
first panel refers to the full frontier case, while second shows the partial
frontier scenario. We consider, from left to right: Compound Altitude,
Crime Incidence and Funding. Green areas mean higher managerial ef-
ficiency, while red stands for the tail of the distribution corresponding to
inefficient levels. In black are those areas discarded for the specific unidi-
mensional analysis.
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greatly increase the computational burden of the analysis.
4.5.4 Bivariate Analyisis: the Joint Impact of Compound
Altitude and Crime Incidence
In this Section we explore the conjoint impact of Compound Altitude and
Crime Incidence on municipalities’ efficiencies. We are not considering
Funding in this setting since the univariate analysis has established its
modest impact. The bivariate analysis consists of a location-scale regres-
sion model, analogous to the one used in the univariate case, where both
the exogenous variables are considered together. Given that the univari-
ate analysis has detected the presence of some extremes, here we opt for
the robust measure of α quantile with α = 0.98.
Figure 21 illustrates the local effect of Compound Altitude and Crime
Incidence on the Alpha frontier: in the upper panel the local mean is de-
picted while in the bottom one the local standard deviation is considered.
For both panels, we report a surface graph on the left, while on the right
we provide the relative contour plot. The multidimensional analysis
mostly confirms the marginal ones. The local mean effect is increasing in
Crime Incidence and this behaviour seem to be affected only marginally
by Compound Altitude. Firstly, for high values of Crime Incidence the
local effect is just slightly smaller for high values of Compound Altitude
than for lower ones; secondly, for high values of Compound Altitude
the rate of increase of the local average is more smoothed. Conversely,
CompoundAltitude has a qualitatively different impact on the local mean
across the range of Crime Incidence: for low values of the latter it affects
negatively the local mean while the opposite holds for high values of
Crime Incidence. However, we highlight that the distribution of sample
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observations is not homogeneous and the estimates of the local effect for
high valuesCrime Incidence and/or small values ofCompound Altitude
are based on a small number of points. The scale impact is of extremely
low magnitude and seems to be not influenced by Compound Altitude,
while it is negatively related withCrime Incidence. Despite an increased
noisiness, similar results hold for the full frontier (see Figure 27 in section
4.8).
The multidimensional specification of the location-scale model suc-
ceed in removing the effects of the two exogenous variables considered:
the correlation between the managerial efficiencies andCompoundAltitude
is −0.04, while the one with respect to Crime Incidence is 0.07 (the cor-
relation when the full frontier is considered are even lower and equal to
−0.02 and 0.02, respectively). In the left panel of Figure 22 it is reported
the histogram of the managerial efficiencies. The distribution is heavily
skewed towards higher values, a result coherent with the richer num-
ber of exogenous factors employed in this Section (Li and Racine 2007),
though entailing a reduced discriminatory power of the analysis. In the
right panel we provide some summary statistics of managerial efficien-
cies broken down by geographical area. Given the remarkable skewness
of the distribution, we will focus on the median behaviour. North West,
North-East, and Center are ranked together in first position, while South
and Islands follows with slightly more and slightly less than half of their
efficiencies, respectively. In Figure 23 the same investigation is under-
took with respect to the unconditional alpha frontier measures of effi-
ciency. As it can be seen, not accounting for exogenous factors deeply
affects the results: while the ranks of North-West and Islands remain sta-
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Figure 21: Second Stage - Compound Altitude and Crime Incidence -
Alpha Frontier. In the upper panel we show the location effect, while in
the bottom panel we exhibit the scale effect. Plots on the left refer to the
3-d representation of the joint impact of Compound Altitude and Crime
Incidence, while on the right we show the corresponding counterplots. The
bivariate analysis refers to the robust version of the frontier when α = 0.98.
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Figure 22: Distribution and Summary Statistics by Geographical Area -
Partial Multidimensional.
Multidimensional Efficiency - α Frontier
area mean median sd n.obs
North-West 0.06 0.15 0.16 16
North-East -0.02 0.15 0.25 16
Center 0.04 0.15 0.22 17
South 0.02 0.09 0.22 21
Islands -0.08 0.06 0.31 13
Figure 23: Distribution and Summary Statistics by Geographical Area -
Partial Unconditional.
Unconditional Efficiency - α Frontier
area mean median sd n.obs
North-West 0.66 0.61 0.23 22
North-East 0.54 0.49 0.28 21
Center 0.60 0.53 0.26 20
South 0.60 0.58 0.29 23
Islands 0.46 0.44 0.25 13
ble, the South moves in second position while the Center is now third
and North-East falls in fourth position. Moreover, the histogram in the
latter figure displays just a small negative skewness. To highlight the
points just raised, in Figure 24 we plot on the Italian map the “pure”
managerial efficiencies obtained from the multidimensional specification
and the Alpha measures of efficiency (respectively, left and right panels).
As it can be easily seen, the right figure has a more homogeneous dis-
tribution of efficiencies than the left one. Nevertheless, a North-South
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pattern is visible on the former, while is absent when unconditional Al-
pha frontier efficiencies is employed.
Figure 24: Alpha Efficiency Measure and “Pure” Managerial Efficiencies
From Multidimensional Analysis
4.6 Discussion
Aim of Section 4.4.5 is to determine qualitatively the relation between
efficiency and three exogenous variables: Compound Altitude, Crime
Incidence and Financing.
With respect to the first one, Compound Altitude, the implicit hypoth-
esis is that municipalities with higher level and/or dispersion of altitude
are characterized by lower efficiency scores. In the literature Boetti et al.
(2012) and Da Cruz and Marques (2014) investigated the same topic us-
ing a dummy for municipality above 600m and the range of altitude re-
spectively, but find no evidence to support a statistically significant rela-
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tion with efficiency
The scientific literature provides supporting evidence of a positive
relation between crime and efficiency in lo Storto (2016) (micro-crimes
per capita is used as a proxy) and in Da Cruz and Marques (2014) (using
crime rate in the analysis).
Finally, a rich literature studied the relationship between debt and
efficiency and has provided theoretical interpretations and empirical ev-
idence supporting both positive and negative effects. Evidence of a posi-
tive link has been rationalized in relation to capital: a larger stock of debt
may be related to higher quantity and quality of the capital stock that
determines efficiency gains that more than offset their cost in terms of
interests. Another explanation is based on fiscal capacity considerations:
municipalities with low fiscal capacity are the ones forced to rely on debt
which, by reducing the stability of the financial/economic equilibrium
of the entity considered, exerts a “disciplinary” effect that eventually de-
termines an improvement of efficiency (Worthington 2000; Benito et al.
2010). Conversely, evidence of a negative effect of debt has been mainly
related to the diversion of resources from productive means to unpro-
ductive interest and amortization costs it entails.(Geys 2006; Geys and
Moesen 2009; Ashworth et al. 2014; Da Cruz and Marques 2014; Cordero
and Pedraja-chaparro 2016). Finally, numerous studies provided no ev-
idence to support a relation between debt and efficiency (Balaguer-Coll
et al. 2007; Revelli and Tovmo 2007; Benito et al. 2007; Balaguer-Coll and
Prior 2009).
As anticipated in section 4.2, the most closely related study to the
present one is lo Storto (2016). Contrary to our findings, a positive re-
lationship between crimes and efficiency is presented in the article. The
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Author interprets this result in the light of the level of development of
a municipality: a higher level of urban micro-criminality and a reduced
capability of the territory to produce economic value added is related
to lower spending that leads to improved efficiency. Given that the lat-
ter study also reports the whole set of efficiency scores, it is possible to
directly investigate its relations with all the measures here developed:
unconditional, conditional-univariates and conditional-multivariate. In
particular, we undertook an analysis of the correlations of both constant
return to scale (crs) and variable return to scale (vrs) DEA measures pre-
sented in lo Storto (2016) with the ones here developed. From this inves-
tigation it can be concluded that the measures of the present study lack a
significant correlation to the ones developed by lo Storto (2016) with the
exception of conditional-univariate scores considering Crime Incidence,
whose Pearson and Spearman coefficients are the more relevant (max-
imal with respect to the vrs-DEA) but negative and equal to −0.209 in
both cases (p-values being 0.05 and 0.04 respectively). In fact, even focus-
ing on the correlation coefficient of higher magnitude (the Spearman one)
and considering the more “related” efficiency measure (crs or vrs), corre-
lation is low and insignificant: unconditionl/vrs-DEA −0.117 with a p-
value of 0.25, conditional-univariate-Financing/crs-DEA −0.084 with a
p-value of 0.42, conditional-multivariate/vrs-DEA −0.06 with a p-value
of 0.57 and conditional-univariate-Compound Altitude/vrs-DEA −0.05
with a p-value of 0.66. Despite the similarities with our work, we ar-
gue that our contribution provides an improvement in the completeness
and reliability of the efficiency evaluation of major Italian municipalities.
From a methodological point of view, the present analysis has two main
strengths. First, outliers treatment has been thoroughly performed us-
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ing an improved version of the methodology proposed by Simar (1996)
and Daraio and Simar (2007a) that is able to account for the conditional
nature of the efficiency estimates (see the discussion Section 4.4.7 for the
relevance of this point). Second, the methodology adopted relies only on
the less-restrictive partial-separability condition to hold, a requirement
whose fulfilment is ensured in Section 4.5.1. Moreover, we argue that the
composite indicator of municipality production activity here developed
provides a more comprehensive and realistic measure of outputs relative
to the narrower set of variables used in previous studies.
In Boetti et al. (2012), an efficiency assessment of Piemonte’s munici-
palities has been performed. Unfortunately, in this case it is not possible
to directly compare efficiencies, however, the article provides an analysis
of the effect of altitude on efficiency by including a dummy variable for
high-altitude observations. Altough the article presents no evidence of a
relation between altitude and efficiency, we are able to identify a negative
link between the two in our chapter. While the remarks on methodology
and data apply in this case too, given the different set on municipalities
under analysis the two result are not mutually exclusive.
4.7 Conclusion
This study applies conditional frontier models to assess the efficiency of
major Italian municipalities for the year 2011. Leveraging on a novel data
set with an unprecedented coverage of goods and services offered by
municipalities, we introduce a composite indicator of local government
output that provides a comprehensive evaluation of the wide range of
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activities performed by municipalities. Using accounting data, we com-
pute a cost-related input measure by matching the functions considered
in the output indicator with the corresponding expenses. Finally, the
composite input-output indicator is used to evaluate managerial perfor-
mances conditional to the exogenous conditions faced by municipalities.
The choice of the external/exogenous measures is based on intuitive
motivations. Obviously, it seems not fair to compare municipalities char-
acterized by different physical conditions and an adjusted measure of
altitude (i.e. the Compound Altitude) is, therefore, included to account
for topographic diversity. Similarly, the social context may influence the
feasible policies implementable by the local manager plausibly impact-
ing the performances of the municipality. For this reason, we include the
level of Crime Incidence to approximate the social environmental con-
ditions. Finally, we introduce the historical level of the stock of debt (i.e.
Funding) to verify whether this constraint plays a role in determining
municipality efficiency.
Our findings show that Compound Altitude acts as an unfavourable
input: municipalities characterized by a higher mix of altitude level and
dispersion are less likely to reach the efficient frontier ceteris paribus the
combination of inputs and outputs. A slightly negative impact is also ob-
served for Crime Incidence, a result implying that additional efforts are
needed by municipalities with high values of this z to achieve efficient
performances. Conversely, we find no evidence of an effect of Funding
on municipality efficiency.
The finding of a negative impact of Compound Altitude on efficiency
is novel in the literature and likely obtained thanks to the improvements
introduced by the present chapter, in terms of both data and methodol-
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ogy, with respect to previous studies. Similarly, evidence of a negative
relationship between crime and performance has never been presented
before and we argue it could serve as a starting point for a fruitful debate
on the topic. Finally, our investigation on the role of Financing, while
not entirely novel, it is the first one referring to the Italian case.
The methodology adopted in the analysis, i.e. the conditional fron-
tier model, has remarkable strengths and weaknesses. From one hand,
the results obtained are based on an extremely narrow set of assump-
tions and can therefore be considered remarkably robust. From the other
hand, the high computational burden needed to perform the analysis
limits the dimensionality of the exogenous variables that can be consid-
ered. Taking into account those traits is vital to a correct interpretation of
the presented results. “Pure” managerial efficiencies here provided have
been washed out from the effects of just two of the plausibly many ex-
ogenous factors affecting it. Hence, while representing a better measure
relative to the unconditional one (and to the univariate ones too), the
“pure” managerial efficiency provided in the bivariate exercise should
be taken with caution if exploited for policy guidance. Still, we remark
that the inclusion of just two exogenous factors has major effects on the
estimated managerial efficiencies and, therefore, an analysis failing to
account for this aspect would be fundamentally flawed.
Theoretical and implementation improvements that would allow to
include a wider set of environmental variables in the analysis is of pri-
mary interest for further research. Indeed, the analytical framework adopted
by the chapter entails computational complexities that limit the set of ex-
ogenous variables that could be included in the analysis while method-
ological constraints call for a strict interpretation of the “exogeneity con-
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dition” in the selection of environmental variables. Furthermore, an ad-
ditional avenue for future research lies in the expansion of the analysis
along the time dimension in order to investigate the dynamics of effi-
ciency also in relation to governmental and local policies. Finally, an
extension of the current work to the whole set of Italian municipalities
would both improve estimation reliability and provide useful informa-
tion to the policymaker.
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4.8 Supporting Information
Multidimensional Efficiency - Full Frontier
area mean median sd n.obs
North-West 0.05 0.09 0.19 16
North-East -0.05 0.05 0.32 16
Center 0.04 0.10 0.26 17
South 0.02 0.09 0.22 21
Islands -0.07 0.03 0.31 13
Figure 25: Distribution and Summary Statistics by Geographical Area - Full
Multidimensional
Unconditional Efficiency - Full Frontier
area mean median sd n.obs
North-West 0.62 0.55 0.23 22
North-East 0.50 0.47 0.23 21
Center 0.57 0.50 0.25 20
South 0.53 0.48 0.27 23
Islands 0.41 0.38 0.23 13
Figure 26: Distribution and Summary Statistics by Geographical Area - Full
Unconditional
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Figure 27: Second Stage - Compound Altitude and Crime Incidence - Full
Frontier
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Figure 28: Outlier Detection and choice of optimal α - Compound Alti-
tude (Left panel whole sample, Right panel without outliers)
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Figure 29: Outlier Detection and choice of optimal α - Crime Incidence
(Left panel whole sample, Right panel without outliers)
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Figure 30: Outlier Detection and choice of optimal α - Funding (Left panel
whole sample, Right panel without outliers)
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